Sunday, April 4, 2021

Liberals Are Currently the Shapers of Society; Meanwhile, Mental Illness Is Increasing and Well-Being Is Decreasing


First of all, I need to make it clear that while the title suggests a battle between conservative and liberal forces, it's really not as simple as that. In the U.S., there is a two-party paradigm—the republicans and the democrats, ostensibly conservatives and liberals, respectively; but much of U.S. politics are just theater. The two parties work to the beck and call of the oligarchy, as represented by their donors and other elements of Permanent Washington—these politicians rarely have any actual principles, and if they do, that will often change them once they're offered more money and privileges, or pretend to have these principles. What I mean by the title is the media and the education system have a massively disproportionate bias when it comes to promoting liberal ideas—often very pernicious ones. They are, therefore, the shapers of society. There isn't a strong opposition in the culture wars. The republicans and other conservative variants are too weak or have become too liberalized to be an effective opposition. The conservatives have failed to conserve anything, and they have become much more liberal as the Overton window shifts, adopting the values of the left. How can the liberals be exclusively blamed when the conservatives set themselves up for failure time and time again?

The two parties are, indeed, two sides of the same coin; the two wings of one bird. They squabble over issues to make it look like there is a fight, but this is the manufactured pretense of political discourse within a "democracy." The propagandistic press curates all of the information to control the views of the masses—if there was a widespread free-flow of information, then this oligarchic system would simply not be sustainable.

The democrats push forward a majority of values that the oligarchy wants for society—all of the woke nonsense. They're now just as pro-immigration as the republicans have long been, betraying the working class which used to be their primary constituency. They are now the party of coastal elites, Wall Street, big business, etc., much like how the republican party was previously characterized as. For those who are interested in what Bernie had to offer on his platform, there is no reason to believe the democrats will ever seriously offer most any of these policies.

The republicans, by contrast, are undergoing a populist shift. On the surface, they seem more sane in many ways. They have their own—sometimes overlapping with the democrats—brand of political correctness, and they are often operating under a very leftist form of morality, but it's not the kind of unsettling woke nonsense that scares normal people. They represent stability and appear to be the voice of reason when it comes to upholding law and order, maintaining gun rights, and are generally more socially conservative and religious. 

If you look at what the parties once were and realize how they've changed, then you will know that the republicans were once much stronger in their social conservatism and religiosity. They increasingly pander to the LGBT minority, with several politicians recently caving on transgender issues, including Asa Hutchinson and Kristi Noem. There were also the red flag laws that began with Trump's presidency.

Both parties pretty much see eye to eye on war and U.S. imperialism and Israel (though the browner portion of the party has complained on this issue increasingly). They both have policies that very visibly benefit the oligarchs. The democrats are suggesting amnesty and are perfectly fine with open borders—it's much the same with the republicans, but they want the invasion to occur legally. The religious right has consistently lost on every issue other than Israel.

I don't feel confident the conservatives will do anything substantial. They're just the necessary controlled opposition to match the excesses of the democrats. Both parties corral different halves of the voting population, pitting them against each other—the bulk of them too busily invested in party politics to see the bigger picture, thinking they're the ones who call the shots because of universal suffrage, but they have very little say about anything. The democrats and republicans take turns blaming all of the country's problems on the other party, and no one is ever held accountable. 

The Current State of Mental Illness

It can be somewhat difficult to gauge how mentally ill a population is within the span of various centuries or decades because the cultural perception of mental illness and the proper way of treating these illnesses is constantly evolving. There are also certain barriers to treatment: firstly, cost and lack of insurance coverage; secondly, there is a stigma associated with seeking treatment for mental illness, though it has been declining over the years. 

Currently, the percentage of the population estimated to have any mental illness is around 20.6% of adults—i.e., the estimate does not include anyone under the age of 18. It's obvious that "any mental illness" is a vague descriptor, giving little indication of severity.  

Gen Z and millennials self-report poorer mental health than older generations, more counseling, and have higher amounts of stress. Older millennials in particular also have higher rates of major depression compared to the general population—23% versus 20%; as well as more chronic health conditions compared to previous generations. Although the sample size is not very big for Gen Z, here are some comparative data from the APA:

Headline issues, from immigration to sexual assault, are causing significant stress among members of Generation Z—those between ages 15 and 21—with mass shootings topping the list of stressful current events, according to the APA report Stress in America: Generation Z released in October.

Specifically, 75 percent of Gen Z members said that mass shootings are a significant source of stress, according to the survey, which was conducted online by The Harris Poll on behalf of APA in July and August 2018 among 3,458 adults and 300 15- to 17-year-olds.

Gen Z members are also more stressed than adults overall about other issues in the news, such as the separation and deportation of immigrant and migrant families (57 percent of Gen Z versus 45 percent of all adults reported the issue is a significant source of stress) and sexual harassment and assault reports (53 percent versus 39 percent).

This generation is also significantly more likely (27 percent) than other generations, including millennials (15 percent) and Gen Xers (13 percent), to report their mental health as fair or poor, the survey found. They are also more likely (37 percent), along with millennials (35 percent), to report they have received treatment or therapy from a mental health professional, compared with 26 percent of Gen Xers, 22 percent of baby boomers and 15 percent of older adults.

First of all, this is to be expected. Mental illness declines with age, and younger cohorts have higher rates of mental illness compared to older cohorts, and that has been the case since at least the 1950s. The main question is whether or not the various age cohorts of recent years have experienced an increase in mental illness compared to the age cohorts of previous decades.


18% of the adult population has some form of anxiety disorder.

Anxiety in general has increased among the various age groups in the U.S., with the 18-25 age group impacted the most in 2008-2018 (for more specific anxiety disorders and their rates, there's this article). The oldest groups (above 50) are the only ones who have remained stable in terms of anxiety levels. 

Anxiety levels are higher among those who have never married. In the past, this would not be an issue, but marriage rates have consistently been dropping since the 1960s, and Americans are delaying marriage for much longer durations now. 


Opinions on this issue differ sharply by age—with young adults much more likely than older adults to say society is just as well off if people have priorities other than marriage and children. Fully two-thirds of those ages 18 to 29 (67%) express this viewpoint, as do 53% of those ages 30 to 49. Among those ages 50 and older, most (55%) say society is better off if people make it a priority to get married and have children.

It's important to stress that future cohorts are going to be even less healthy in all measures with the way these attitudes are trending, along with other factors such as anti-natal policies, the Covid-19 lockdowns and the climate change craze, feminism, etc., that will reduce both marriage rates and birth rates. The critical period for a woman's beauty and fertility is not long and is declining rapidly (declining fertility also applies to males). Being unable to fulfill the role of a mother will lead to much greater unhappiness for women especially. The middle-aged, unmarried, childless career woman is the least happy demographic (they also have the highest rate of depression of any group according to at least one CDC study, though depression typically declines with age; this shift, assuming it is regularly replicated, is likely because of less marriage, fertility, and child birth) in the U.S. While women in the past might have been able to have a kid at 40 years of age, it's getting harder for women to do so even in their 30s.

Females are hypergamous and value steady work and a high income (at least as high, preferably higher than what the female makes) in their male partners. Unemployment is increasing and statistics for this measure fall short of the truth because the unemployment rate does not account for the labor force participation rate. Wages are decreasing and females are increasingly given preferential treatment in hiring because of a woke and feminist culture. Furthermore, H-1B workers are being prioritized for higher paying tech jobs, and are frequently competing against Americans in other fields—exerting downward pressure on wages. All of these points indicate that the dating pool for both sexes will decrease, and both will be less happy and less likely to start families—perpetuating more anxiety.

Some level of anxiety is normal and even good, but a persistent anxious temperament or subclinical anxiety increases one's chance of developing an anxiety disorder, depression, substance abuse, or other health issues. Since it's believed that brain development is complete at approximately 25 years of age, and such issues affect brain development, mitigating onset of any of these issues before 25 should be seen as one of our foremost concerns, along with eliminating environmental stressors, such as endocrine-disrupting and carcinogenic chemicals and food items. 


A 1989 study, titled Increasing Rates of Depression, sets a grim tone for the post-WWII era. "Previously, depression was regarded as a disorder of middle-aged and elderly persons; now, adolescents and young adults are increasingly depressed and seeking treatment. These younger cohorts have also experienced increased rates of alcoholism, drug abuse, and suicide attempts and deaths." Admissions to hospitals for affective illnesses, such as depression, was greater in the 1950-1980 period compared to the 1920-1950 period, and the average age of those admitted was considerably younger than the pre-WWII era. These generational differences are known as a birth-cohort effect. Similar results were found in other studies from the U.S. and from New Zealand, Germany, Sweden, and Canada; the results were not replicated in Puerto Rico, Mexican Americans in Los Angeles, or in South Korea. 

It's possible the phenomenon is associated more with whites than either Asians or hispanic groups, a large portion of whom have varying degrees of white admixture or none. Mexican immigrants have a lower prevalence of mental illness and higher life satisfaction compared to those of Mexican descent who were born in America, even when the former has a lower socioeconomic status. Hispanics have unexpected—often described as paradoxical—advantages compared to other demographics, despite being worse off on several measures: life expectancy of U.S.-born and immigrant Mexicans are 2 and 4 years greater than U.S. whites, respectively. [1]

This birth-cohort effect is not necessarily a result of laxer criteria either, according to Lavori et al., for the portion suffering from "severe" forms of major depression are also greater compared to the older cohorts. In relation to depressive events, Suicide, hospitalization, and seeking treatment increased as well. While one might propose that the difference in what one generation might consider "severe" is subjective—not just from the standpoint of society but also psychotherapists—and varies with cultural shifts, we're not just dealing with self-reportage here.

In Spiers et al., they partially concur with the birth cohort studies, [2] but they remain more conservative, stating "The cohort of people born between 1950 and 1956 had significantly higher rates of depression than their precursors born between 1943 and 1949, across all three depression measures (Table 2)." They report more stability afterwards: "Age-specific rates of depression were then relatively stable across all cohorts born after 1956, with the possible exception of depressive disorder. The latter showed consecutive but non-significant increases in prevalence across all four pairs of cohorts from 1964-1970 to 1985-1991." For the 1993-2007 samples, there are small increases in depression measures for both men and women, but most of the results end up relatively stable when moving from 2000 to 2007.

Mojtabai et al. found an increase in 12-month prevalence of major depressive events in adolescents: an increase of 8.7% to 11.3% in the 2004 to 2015 period. When looking at the adult population as a whole, depression prevalence doesn't typically rise much, if at all, but as the previously cited studies indicate, there often appears to be an increase in prevalence for the youngest cohorts.

Depression rates by age group, according to Twenge et al.:

Perhaps the relative stability suggested by Spiers is correct up to 2007, though Twenge et al. suspect that "Indicators of mood disorders, suicide-related outcomes, and rates of deaths by suicide rose between the mid-2000s and 2017, primarily driven by increases among adolescents and adults ages 18 to 25." Though these results are congruent with all racial demographics, the ascent is greatest among whites, especially if they are of higher socioeconomic status or are girls/women (though keep in mind that regardless of what the percent increase is, men commit suicide at much higher rates). 

This trend of rising depression is also quite similar to countries like Canada, Denmark, and the UK; many of the developed countries are witnessing rising depression amongst most age groups, and even for countries with a fairly stable level of depression, there tends to be an increase among the younger population groups, as can be seen in Germany.

Although I will briefly allude to issues of modernity throughout, such as obesity, diet, lack of exercise, fewer hours of sleep, lack of sunlight, overuse of social media and electronics, etc., there is a good article on the subject from Hidaka.


Younger age groups (10-24) also commit fewer suicides than older populations, but there was a 56% increase in suicides (a peak of 10.6 out of 100,000) from 2007 to 2017. 

One might easily get the impression suicide has risen for all groups and is substantially higher compared to the past, but that's not quite true.


In 2017, 14 out of every 100,000 Americans died by suicide, according to a new analysis released by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Center for Health Statistics. That’s a 33% increase since 1999, and the highest age-adjusted suicide rate recorded in the U.S. since 1942. (Rates were even higher during the Great Depression, hitting a century peak of 21.9 in 1932.)

Suicide used to be higher in the pre-WWII era, even before the Great Depression, dipping quite low in the 1990s, starting to rise as the internet became more ubiquitous, then it started to rise rapidly around the time of the 2008 stock market crash. Proposed reasons are the influence of the opioid epidemic and its effect upon the loved ones and friends of users—another is social media and more internet usage, which often leads to isolation and sometimes even cyberbullying. Economic downturns can also be quite influential.

Overall global rates of suicide are actually declining as the U.S.'s rates are rising. Most developed countries are enjoying declining rates, and it's usually only very poor or war-torn countries that have seen an increase.

The younger population accounts for most of the increase during the 1990s, for the oldest population had seen a decline in suicide rates, while populations closer to middle age were relatively stable. 

In the 2000s, all age groups continue to have increasing suicide rates. In 2018, suicide was the second leading cause of death for those in the 10-34 age bracket. Hospitalization due to suicidal ideation and suicide attempts also had small increases in the adolescent population in 2008-2015.

It also bears mentioning the existence of superior infrastructure and medical treatment in place for preventing attempted suicides from resulting in a death, as well as far more outreach for prevention. These changes would partly explain why the rates were so high before WWII ended, aside from obvious ones, like the stock market crash and unemployment. Without these differences, the rates would most likely be higher, and despite an increasing quality of life in several measures, suicide is rising again. There are many societal factors which would likely explain the rise, and we can expect it will get much worse with the Covid-19 lockdowns and the money printed-delay of economic disaster.

Life Satisfaction and Happiness

According to Trzesniewski and Donnellan's study, life satisfaction/happiness (LSH) remained stable from 1976 to 2006 in the U.S., along with... basically everything else, give or take a small increase or decrease of some variable by a few percent.

Our World in Data provides some helpful charts to get a grasp of how different countries rank happiness. 

There is a positive correlation between LSH and income, so it's obvious that, by default, the happiest countries will be prosperous European countries: Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, etc. U.S., UK, Germany, France and others, despite their wealth and power, have a greater demographic problem, worse health, and other factors that place them below the highest ranking countries. African countries rate the lowest, seeing as they are impoverished, crime-riddled, and corrupt countries. Northeast Asian countries also rank quite well, though China is still lagging behind. The assumed reason for why Asian countries aren't higher is a difference of collectivist versus individualist countries.

Latin America ranks higher in LSH than other countries (Eastern European countries, for example) with comparable economic development. This appears to be a racial and cultural difference, similar to how immigrant latinos have a higher average LSH compared to whites, even if the former is poorer.

Health is an important component of LSH, and general health has been in decline since the boomers. There is more drinking and smoking, poorer measures of physical and mental health, higher rates of fatness and obesity. Neither obesity nor drinking, smoking, or other drugs accounted for all of the changes.

Given my biases, I would expect LSH to be declining in the U.S. It is largely a measure of health and income, however, and per capita wealth, though in decline, still allows Americans many luxuries compared to other countries. The U.S. has high rates of fatness, obesity, declining health, and consistently less than stellar health care, so that is another reason we would expect LSH to drop.

Surveys are very subjective measures, and LSH is no different. How do we perceive ourselves and others, and how do we determine a low or high LSH? According to data from Our World in Data, South Korea had a LSH of 90%, but those surveyed guessed that only 24% of citizens were happy; likewise, Norway had an average guess of 60% LSH, when it was around 90%. In these instances, the subject usually rated themselves as being happier than the average for their country. There is a tendency for humans to have an optimistic view of themselves and a pessimistic (or comparably so) view of society. There is also the possibility of reference-group effects:
Reference-group effects (discovered in cross-cultural settings) occur when responses to self-report items are based not on respondents' absolute level of a construct but rather on their level relative to a salient comparison group.
Perhaps subjective beliefs about one's own LSH are not very accurate? It's always hard to say with subjective measures. There will always be variance in perception of LSH and actual LSH, but if the U.S. has a reasonable quality of life; i.e., one can go to school, get a job, socialize, have a roof over his head, and have access to entertainment or hobbies, should we really expect LSH to drop very much? Even if the country might be comparably worse than it was in the past in many ways? 

Poverty levels might be lower than they were in the past, but it's becoming more common for adults to live with their parents—I'm skeptical of the 52% number, but it is higher than it once was. Houses are becoming more expensive (recently, the absurd inflation of lumber prices has added an average price increase of $36,000 to new homes, though housing prices had already been on the rise for years), and now there's the two-income trap, where married couples often both have to work; whereas in the past a family could live on the male's income alone. Religiosity is down; divorce is up; the selection of jobs and wages are worse than ever because of illegal and legal migration; families are less stable and less likely to form in the first place.

Despite many problems in both sexes and in society... what is stopping one from becoming absorbed in video games, porn, movies, social media for virtue signaling and belief reinforcement, having fun with friends, drugs, etc.? Even if your job is unfulfilling and your future is less secure than your boomer or gen X parents, are you really going to perceive yourself as less happy? Here is where it makes sense why collectivist countries tend to rank lower in LSH compared to individualist countries. The individualist becomes focused on his own worldly pursuits and has a diminished appreciation or concern for what is happening in society as a whole; the collectivist has a broader perspective and is less inclined to think only of himself. 

If the individualist has disposable income and plenty of escapism to indulge in, then he is often none the wiser to his decline. The media conditions its consumers to be content with their lot, even as everything around them depreciates. The World Economic Forum carries the message to its most transparent (and, therefore, it is ineffective and mocked on Twitter by everyone) conclusion: "You will own nothing, and you will be happy." 

LSH is probably not very malleable unless one makes comparisons about society as a whole (and only a select few will do this), or income or health drop considerably below the average. It's not a very strong indicator of how much life is worsening on average, because the peasant does not even know he is being exploited by a contemptuous elite class.  

Overall, I don't think LSH is a very useful measure or anything to pay attention to. It's largely a measure of income+health with a degree of extra variance due to ethnic/racial and cultural differences.

That's my perspective on the issue if it's true that LSH has remained relatively stable.
However, other researchers have used methods which suggest happiness (not sure how important it is to separate happiness from life satisfaction in this case, but they are not synonymous, despite overlap) is actually declining. 

The World Happiness Report indicates overall happiness in the U.S. has declined by 6% between 2007-2018. 

Twenge (again, just as with depression) opens with her usual doom and gloom, going on to point out the disproportionate burden that 6% decrease is having on adolescents and young adults:  
The years since 2010 have not been good ones for happiness and well-being among Americans. Even as the United States economy improved after the end of the Great Recession in 2009, happiness among adults did not rebound to the higher levels of the 1990s, continuing a slow decline ongoing since at least 2000 in the General Social Survey (Twenge et al., 2016; also see Figure 5.1). Happiness was measured with the question, “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” with the response choices coded 1, 2, or 3.
She also points out numerous factors associated with lower well-being, such as an increase in self-harm, depression, and suicidal ideation.
This decline in happiness and mental health seems paradoxical. By most accounts, Americans should be happier now than ever. The violent crime rate is low [it's in the process of rising rapidly because of the BLM riots and the systemic racism conspiracy theory], as is the unemployment rate. Income per capita has steadily grown over the last few decades. This is the Easterlin paradox: As the standard of living improves, so should happiness – but it has not.

It's not actually as rosy as she makes it out to be, of course. U.S. crime rates are much higher compared to Asian and European countries, and most forms of crime are committed at higher rates compared to 1960, even after crime declined in the 1990s. Income per capita has grown, but it's not that tremendous of an increase when adjusted for inflation, factoring in bills, food, medical, etc., and when we consider the lack of affordability of houses and the high tuition rates compared to what they were in the 1950s or 1960s, this leaves many people living paycheck to paycheck and/or in debt. 

Also, if we look at wealth by generation, there is a clear demarcation. Boomers own 57% of the wealth, while it's only 16% for Gen X, and 3% for millenials. You'd expect discrepancies because it can be expected that the older population will be wealthier as they've had more time to build their careers. However, Adults under 40 owned 13% of the wealth in 1989, but only 7% in 2021. We can see the generational shrinkage even more clearly by observing that when boomers were at the median age of 35 in 1990, they owned 21% of the wealth; with the same median age in 2008, Gen Xers owned only 9% of the nation's wealth; millenials will reach this median age in 4 years, and they will need to triple their wealth or increase it sevenfold to catch up to Gen X and the boomers, respectively.

Here are some charts for a visual depiction of the issue from Financial Times:

Those corrections aside, what is the explanation? One factor might be a weakening of social support networks and social capital—listed examples of social capital decreasing include the perception of government and businesses becoming more corrupt over time and confidence in public institutions. As can be seen with Putnam's study on social capital, mass immigration and diversity also lower social capital, resulting in lower trust within and across racial populations (here is also another list of examples of how social capital is lowered in various ways, according to Putnam).

Other reasons are high rates of obesity, increasing depression, drug usage, and declining health (especially life expectancy compared to other developed countries) because of more sedentary lifestyles, increased drug usage, and poor diets. 

Another likely factor is family structure. Divorce has risen greatly ever since no-fault divorce was enacted as a policy. Single motherhood is also far more common, especially among blacks. Being raised by one parent is associated with worse outcomes, but the less stable family structure will often mean the mother dates or cohabits with other men or marries a man unrelated to her children. Higher amounts of abuse of varying forms is higher with these arrangements.

If we look at one of the two sexes, a decline in female LSH is noted by many researchers, and the reasons seem obvious enough. Society has been structured to make it more difficult to maintain a marriage, to have children, and birth control is abundant. Marriage is a great source of anxiety for the non-married and unmarried, childless career women are the least happy group—i.e., they lack fertility and/or the sex appeal they had in their prime to attract a mate or to have kids—now it's unlikely they will be able to carry out their biological function—and women define just about everything by their sexuality. Either people who study this stuff for a living pretend they don't understand women, or they don't understand women—they go so far as to call it a "paradox" that women became more empowered by second-wave feminism and had more rights but were less happy compared to men (and they're happier when it's the other way around). It's only a paradox if you don't realize fundamental differences in the two sexes. Clearly, becoming a mother is hardwired into female psychology, and to place their career above having children is going to lead to women being less happy—it's obvious that men want to pass on their genes as well, but they derive far more satisfaction from their career than women will ever understand, and often, ambition and being a workaholic will carry them along, whereas it will crush a woman in the longterm. It's really that simple. By the time these women realize everything they've learned from feminist rags and the intelligentsia is false, they just double down and push these ideas even harder so they don't have to see the cold reality for what it is.

The most salient factor for a decline in happiness for Twenge is, as can be surmised through her numerous articles in popular publications, involves the increased usage of smartphones, computers, and social media—at least when it comes to adolescents and young adults. 2012 is the year when the majority of adolescents began to own smartphones, and all negative measures increased further after this point. It's understandable why she would think this is one of the most likely factors, considering the average 12th grader in 2007 spent over 6 hours using the internet, social media, or texting, and by 2018, 95% of adolescents had a smartphone and 45% reported they used the internet "almost constantly." This means less in-person social interaction and less social development.

More sleeping, more exercise, more religious gatherings or other events, less screen-time, and more face-to-face interaction are associated with greater happiness and well-being. Obviously, the younger generations are doing less of what is likely to make them happier in favor of what will make them less happy. 


With Covid-19, the results are even grimmer in terms of declining well-being. 

Therapy Generation?

One psychologist's experience led her to refer to millennials as the "therapy generation." It would seem this epithet is better suited to Gen Z.

Another psychologist gives the impression that stigma around mental illness or seeking therapy has, indeed, evolved: 

“Many of my clients joke that they and their co-workers often start conversations with, ‘My therapist thinks…’” says Elizabeth Cohen, a clinical psychologist in Manhattan, “The shame of needing help has been transformed to a pride in getting outside advice.”

Younger people having higher reported rates of mental illness in recent years compared to previous cohorts could in part have something to do with the way older people perceive stigmas around mental health and treatment; in a university setting, there are often workshops and presentations and a lot of advertisements concerning suicide and mental illness; the counseling centers are usually subsidized as part of the students' tuition fees, and in many cases there isn't a separate cost to see a school therapist/counselor. The perspective among these younger—often more liberal and mentally ill than the general population—students is often one of overwhelming support for therapy and an incessant encouragement to talk about one's feelings, mental illness, and other assorted problems.

I'm not implying therapy is a bad thing or isn't helpful per se, but this environment shapes attitudes about mental health and treatment in a way that differs from other environments, or even the universities of many decades ago.

It's good to have an outlet to express your problems or receive treatment for diagnosable mental illnesses, but maybe we've gone too far to the point that we really are creating a therapy generation?

To some extent, this issue is addressed by Nick Haslam, which I will comment on further below, but for now I will provide a quote concerning trauma—a greatly expanded definition, bringing to mind "trigger warnings."

Individual trauma results from an event, series of events, or set of circumstances that is experienced by an individual as physically or emotionally harmful or threatening and that has lasting adverse effects on the individual’s functioning and physical, social, emotional, or spiritual well-being.

I'm not in a position to be sure of how psychotherapists would interpret this definition of trauma. Maybe most have their own definition or don't adhere to a similar definition too literally (favoring instead the recent DSM definition). That's not really the point—it's a useful example for how commonplace experiences from the past can be reinterpreted as overwhelmingly stressful. It doesn't have to stem from a dangerous scenario or an unusual experience like you would see with PTSD. Wouldn't listening to a speech you don't agree with apply as trauma under this definition? Campus speaking events are blocked and disrupted. Students destress in "safe spaces" because of microagressions... or something...  trigger warnings don't help prepare a person for the world, but they keep expecting them—just like how venting is not an effective means of overcoming problems. Maybe none of this counts as a mental illness, but if we continue to coddle these conformists they will experience overwhelming amounts of stress from totally ordinary and innocuous stimuli—they're inuring themselves into a maladaptive state and setting themselves up for a real mental disorder—if they don't already have one. I would argue this kind of behavior is already comparable to a mental illness, but I'm not the one deciding on definitions nor am I responsible for diagnoses. 

Most psychotherapy is about learning coping strategies and endowing yourself with a better mental model of how to adapt to the world. It's built upon self-change, but perhaps it's the society that needs to be changed, and the mental illness and general dysfunction is a normal response to a severely messed-up social climate. In medicine, prevention is preferable to letting an illness develop and then finding a cure (though the opposite is usually how medicine is handled nowadays). Shouldn't it be the same when it comes to mental health? 

Discussing mental illness is not just prevalent in the university, but also on social media. There is an enormous amount of data indicating that social media is both addictive and can have a negative effect on mental health, and it's no wonder that our tech overlords restrict the screen usage of their children. While social media has a clear role in why recent generations have worse mental health, the specific reason to broach the subject in this context is to note the behavior of celebrities and influencers who use social media, many of whom enjoy the attention of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of followers. 

With songs like WAP (otherwise known as Wet-Ass Pussy) by Cardi B and Ariana Grande's 34+35, it's apparent that there are quite a few awful role models for adolescents and young adults, promoting values that may seem "fun" or "good" or "exciting" in the short term, when divorced of reason and in the moment, but in the long term, the bulk of data indicates worse outcomes (though this paragraph appears to be focused on casual sex, the same can be said of unmoderated drug or alcohol use, an obsession with money and consumption, and living a cynical, nihilistic lifestyle in general) for those unfortunate enough to succumb to a life of decadence. 

In the past, it was common for the public to not know about the addictions and afflictions of celebrities. They kept it behind closed doors. A seedy tabloid might report a scoop on a celebrity, but, otherwise, you'd probably be left waiting for a biography to come out after they've passed. The Contemporary celebrities are often quite the opposite, publicly discussing their troubles with depression and other issues in detail to their followers. Not only are they a mess, but they often seem to take pleasure in letting you know they are a mess.

A London blogger named Vix Meldrew says she receives her greatest responses when she talks about mental health on social media, and she believes the reason is because she is "making them [her followers] feel less alone."

In one sense, this attention brought to mental illness seems good, but maybe it's better to leave this kind of messaging to more neutral sources and our "role models" should project more strength or be inspiring in some way—or outwardly appear to be a good or normal role model, even if they may not be one to admire in their private life. It gets to the point that our "role models" flaunt their problems so often that you might think it's a part of their brand, and if they're ill, maybe I am, too—maybe we all are. Do they have to envelop all of us in their collective nightmare?

Greater access to therapy is wonderful, if needed, but we don't need this kind of therapism—a culture swaddled in nonstop ads and advertisements on mental illness and therapy—where everyone is talking about their inner minutia all the time, and it seems so widespread, and we're overflowing with empathy, emotion, and we let it all out for the entire world to hear and see, along with our tears. [3]

Frankly, it's pathetic, and I don't want it to sound like I'm mocking people who engage in this behavior. It's not their fault; they're just doing what comes naturally in the culture they were brought up in. Reward non-beneficial behaviors in favor of beneficial behaviors, and you reap what you sow—one generation begets the next and unloads their baggage on their next of kin or leaves them stumbling through the darkness; how is the subsequent (or the one that preceded them, for that matter) generation to know the best path to take—or at least one not fraught with despair? The intellectuals bicker and constantly plot against the citizens, tugging them in a multitude of directions—it's often the most injurious voices that are heard the loudest.

Mental illness should be dealt with similarly to how broken windows policies were crafted to mitigate crime. These policies involved keeping the cities tidy—repairing broken windows or any kind of property damage and cleaning graffiti—the idea was that if parts of the society were left to decay, it would promote the spread of that decay; minor crimes were enforced rather than decriminalizing everything shy of murder and rape, like in California. Liberals will say it "doesn't work." It doesn't work when they want to circumvent the process. If you want to see a tough on crime model that works, look no further than Singapore—punishment is swift and sufficiently severe, the cities are clean and spotless, the crime is low, and if you behave like a scoundrel, you'll get your rear end caned for good measure. It works, but we consistently have the problem of democracy—which is just a veiled oligarchy with ersatz freedom—getting in the way and ensuring we do whatever doesn't work for anyone except for the elites.

Project health, strength, and an ideal of betterment and promote policies conducive to improving health and well-being and we might actually get somewhere. 

Another thing to be aware of is the horizontal and vertical extension of disorders—i.e., if we examine the history of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), starting with the DSM's precursor, War Department Technical Bulletin, Medical 203, we find that the list of diagnosable conditions went from a mere 47 to over 300 by the time of the DSM-5, which was over the span of 1943-2013. 

Nick Haslam wrote an informative article on the subject, referring to these expansions as concept creep. Behaviors once not thought of as a disorder became a disorder, and increasingly milder forms of a disorder ended up as its own condition—a good example of the latter would be cyclothymia being essentially a pared-down version of bipolar disorder 1 and 2. 

Most of what we now consider conditions, which were not thought of as such in the past, seem reasonable to include, but then we get to the issue of whether mental illness is increasing or if we're just expanding our criteria to account for the conditions we have overlooked. It's hard to say, but we can certainly see that what counts as major depression has not changed much since the 1970s, and the prevalence of this condition is increasing. The same can be said of other very distinct disorders/illnesses—one only need look at studies for the changing prevalence rate of individual diagnoses, rather than looking at a generic chart showing an uptick in any mental illness overall (obviously, this does not apply to all conditions, as some were changed rather heavily with different iterations of the DSM or didn't become a recognizable condition until much later). [4]

Even in the instance that contextual and normal sadness, worry, or fear is being misconstrued as an actual diagnosable condition, these generalized problems are also becoming more common. Sometimes we are born dysfunctional, but we all have certain dispositions to become dysfunctional in some shape or form, and as we encounter a society that is dysfunctional, we can only expect to become more dysfunctional in increasingly large quantities. Even what is sloughed off as "not a condition" can easily lead to one.

Furthermore, if you look at a very healthy group, such as the Amish, and compare their adolescents to the general population, you will see a world of difference because the Amish focus on what makes humans happier and healthier, mentally and physically, rejecting all the fluff that tends to lead to dissatisfaction. If you look at hunter-gatherers, agricultural societies, and modern societies, you will see an upward trend in depression and other mental illnesses. Based on everything I have observed, regardless of concept creep, I think it would be disingenuous to take a skeptical approach based on these thought experiments—modernity clearly has given rise to many factors which lead to less well-being and more mental illness and general distress.

This is not an anti-civilizational or a "back to nature" stance that I am advocating. Regardless of how healthy the Amish are, there are certain advantages in what they give up, and living as they do is only possible as a nation within a nation—otherwise, it's luck of the draw whether or not a more powerful country subsumes them or disrupts their way of life; unless there is an ally or overarching body that prevents hostilities against an Amish state, but they are ultimately dependent on others. If we did not implement technological advancements to bolster our military, we could easily be overpowered by a sufficiently hostile and technologically superior country and be left to follow the whims of a foreign power. Many of our inventions have saved us time and allowed us to prioritize more important endeavors. But there needs to be a more pragmatic cost-benefit analysis accompanying every change, minor or major, and we should always approach new advancements with some degree of consternation. The U.S. has a tendency to place profits above the well-being of the nation, and that has to change.

We often fail to truly understand the effects something might have on society until we have implemented a change. To take a tangible example, a cellphone is obviously very useful, and it was a worthwhile invention. The smartphone expanded the basic cellphone to have a functionality similar to a home PC. This is a useful upgrade, but perhaps smartphones are too ubiquitous. Children spend far more time on smartphones now, and it is stunting their growth and affecting their health in various ways, and they're addicted to social media. Wouldn't it be prudent for parents to limit screen-time or purchase a normal cellphone instead for contacting their offspring and so emergency calls can be made? We could easily have campaigns focusing on smartphone usage, but we don't—at least not visible ones to affect change for the better. A serious, spirited campaign of this sort would hurt the revenue of smartphone companies, and company profits are placed above well-being, every step of the way. The government doesn't even lift a finger to curb the obesity epidemic we're experiencing—they have no interest in improving man—only to make him fatter and dumber, for then we are the perfect cattle.

Although there may be other factors to consider when it comes to comparing younger cohorts to older cohorts, its obvious that the younger generations have a higher prevalence of mental illness compared to previous cohorts, and there isn't much reason to believe it's getting any better or will in the foreseeable future. 

The Mental Illness of the Left

However, even for those who haven't done any research on the subject of mental illness and whether it's liberals/the left or conservatives/the right who suffer more from this problem, they've still probably noticed that younger people don't seem as well-adjusted compared to previous generations; most have seen the safe spaces, the trigger warnings, the panic attacks, the emotional breakdowns, boutique SJW issues and an unwillingness to debate ideas that conflict with their world view, as well as the general hysteria and neuroticism on campuses and outside of campuses, whether they be bizarre protests, social media policing, Drag Queen Story Hour, pride parades, needle-choked and feces-strewn California, or full-scale "Fiery, but mostly peaceful" Black Lives Matter riots. 

(I'm going to be very general with my usage of terms like left/liberal/democrat and right/conservative/republican in most instances, using them almost interchangeably to refer to the current left versus right paradigm that we are seeing in the U.S.)

How did we end up coming to this point? Wasn't psychological research and treatment the means to an end for better mental fitness? Oh, right—psychologists need mentally ill people to earn a living, so I guess they're not too interested in preventative measures; it's already a very competitive and oversaturated field. I wouldn't go so far as to say modern psychologists intend to make people more mentally ill for the sake of their practice, like how most "domestic terrorism" is the result of the FBI setting up mentally ill people to commit crimes for the sake of furthering the FBI's political agendas and increased funding, but the priorities of the field have never been entirely in concordance with a society's needs. Psychology is a largely Jewish science, along with the other softer sciences, after all.  

The data from a March 2020 Pew survey was gathered by the doctorate student Zach Goldberg (his page compiles a lot of interesting political data into charts and graphs), who then created several charts that demonstrated liberals are far more likely to be diagnosed with a mental illness—conveniently, the political affiliation is on a spectrum, and it aggregates those queried into two separate racial categories—"white" and "non-white." 

"Conservative" is the most healthy group based on this measure, and it only gets slightly worse further to the right, whereas "Conservative" to "Very Liberal" is a constant increase, with the "Very Liberal" whites scoring the highest—either way, liberal whites are always higher than the non-whites. "Conservative" whites are the healthiest of all the groups on this measure. 

The oldest age group is also the healthiest in this measure for all political affiliations, with conservatives again scoring the best and liberals the worst.

For the frequency of negative health symptoms, there is still a noticeable difference, though not as pronounced, and conservatives are still doing the best.

(The two above charts correspond to questions about whether the subject feels lonely, anxious, depressed, and/or other anomalies.)

Goldberg notes that part of the difference in the results could be that liberals are more likely to seek mental health evaluations. They are also higher in the big five personality trait neuroticism, while also scoring lower in queries of life-satisfaction/happiness, leading the author to consider some of the results may be genuine, though a portion could be exaggerated due to other variables. Alternatively or in addition, conservatives may be less inclined to report mental issues, feeling it is a private matter.

A look at Big 5 differences between liberals who answered yes and no to being diagnosed.

Unsurprisingly, not only do "Very Liberal" whites (38% or 45.9%, depending on the chart) score the worst, but "White Liberal" women (56.3%) score the worst of all groupings, and more than twice as much as "White Conservative" women. Conservatives again score the best. 

None of the data above is probably a surprise for anyone with an honest appraisal of the U.S. You can pretty much figure this out through observation. I'm sure a lot of conservatives will want to use this data to "own the libs," but it's really quite depressing, and it's clear this difference in mental fitness is part of the polarization in the U.S. and the bizarre antics and teachings that can be found on campus.

What I'd love to see, though I had no luck finding it, and it may not exist, would be this same kind of comparison of party affiliations/ideologies and mental illness, in the early 20th century (the earliest I've seen to touch on this is a 1991 survey, the data of which is utilized by Emil Kirkegaard; though the further back you go, the less comparable and more inaccurate the diagnostic methods will be). I suspect the differences found here would be closer to parity, though personality characteristics and lower religiosity of liberals would probably indicate that they still have a mildly or moderately higher rate of mental illness compared to conservatives, but certainly not more than double! The left of the early 20th century was far more focused on economics and the working class, but all of that has been replaced by anti-white politics, the progressive stack, open borders, LGBTQ, etc. 

None of these white elitist concerns help improve the lives of the people or the stability of the nation—not to say the GOP is doing anything to ameliorate the situation either. Democrats are eager to grant amnesty to secure their party's power and support lax immigration policies that will further affect wages and housing prices, only serving to pad the GDP at the expense of per capita wealth. Just about every survey coming out on the subject will indicate citizens are most stressed about the economy, jobs, money, etc, and that will only be exacerbated with the lockdowns and the never ending flood of migrants.

Goldberg further expands on the original data presentation with depression/stress index scores.

For those curious about diagnosable mental illnesses other than depression, Buzzfeed, of all places, teamed up with SurveyMonkey to see how the left and right compare in terms of specific conditions. The article includes many simplified, bigger graphics with only democrats and republicans. Like all other data, liberals have higher rates.

In relation to this high rate of depression/stress, the difference is small, but the very liberal group, after controlling for age, uses medication at higher rates. Since age is controlled for, the majority of these prescribed medications are probably SSRIs—the most often used drug for ages 20-59.

This is the only comparison I've ever seen of medication use in association with political affiliation, so I really don't have a point of reference here. My guess would be that a serious study of SSRI usage according to political beliefs would lead to a much different distribution than the chart above—very liberal samples would have astronomical usage rates and it wouldn't be so equal. 

Anti-depressant usage has jumped 65% in 15 years (1999-2014). 1 in every 8 Americans over the age of 12 reported recent anti-depressant usage, according to the CDC in 2014—women are represented at 16.5%, while men are just under 9%. 1 in 4 surveyed (sample of 14,000 Americans) reported having taken anti-depressants for a period of a decade. For this particular study, 16.5% of whites, 5.6% of blacks, 5% of hispanics, and 3.3% of Asians used an antidepressant during the last 30 days of the survey. 

There's reason to proceed with caution when you're only given one source of data, but these same results were replicated in a study by Emil Kirkegaard as well. 

Kirkegaard starts off by referring to data from a Slate Star Codex Reader Survey with results from 8,043 subjects from various political stratums. 

Slate Star Codex (SSC) readers, of course, represent a biased sample because all of the data is drawn from a single STEM blog. The author of SSC also makes some other noteworthy points here about why the results may not be overly reliable. Yet it shows the same pattern: leftists have higher reported rates of mental illnesses. The data, as originally presented by Philippe Lemoine, breaks down left and right into various political ideologies. There is a good bit of variance in the results. The "far-right" category is generally a little bit less stable compared to conservatives and moderates, but without exception the more "far-left" categories have the greater perceived and/or diagnosed mental illness rate. In one chart, categories 1 and 2 ("far-left") had a formal diagnosis of at least one condition 42.5% and 31.4% of the time, respectively; compared to 19.4% for 10, the most "far-right" category, and the lowest being 17.7% in the conservative range, trending closer to the middle. Another chart has the "far-left" category at 38% and the "far-right" at just 11.8%.

The more persuasive data is drawn from the General Social Survey (GSS), which is a representative sample of the U.S. population, beginning in 1972 and still continuing. Some 13 years before Kirkegaard, in 2007, this same data was used by a blogger called the Inductivist, who found that 30% of "really liberal" people had a mental illness based on the data. The data trends similarly to Goldberg, Lemoine, and Kirkegaard.
Since 1972 the GSS has conducted 26 in-person, cross-sectional surveys of the adult household population of the U.S. Interviews have been conducted with a total of 51,020 [this is outdated; the number at the time Kirkegaard authored his paper was 64,814], respondents. The 1972-74 surveys used modified probability designs and the remaining surveys were completed using a full-probability sample design, producing a high-quality, representative sample of the adult population of the U.S. The GSS has a response rate of over 70 percent above that of other major social science surveys and 40-45 percentage points higher than the industry average. 
Not all 64,814 subjects were asked the same question. These are the samples that Kirkegaard had to work with:
One issue with this study is that the most "extreme left and right groups" are quite a small part of the sample (apparently only 5% on both sides of the sample in 2018, according to Kirkegaard).

The general pattern you would expect of conservatives rating lower on mental illness measures still holds true with this data. Females also tended to exhibit greater mental illness rates than men, though there was divergence in this result at the left/right fringes. Probably an issue with the "extreme" samples being too small.

Furthermore, it's consistently shown by various studies in multiple countries that mentally ill patients prefer to vote for the liberal candidates (1, 2, 3, 4). While this could just be a general correlation between mental illness and liberalism, as has been demonstrated extensively above, it might also be the case that the mentally ill or those who end up as outpatients because of a mental illness are more inclined to vote for the liberal candidate because they believe the liberal party is more likely to cater to the needs of mental patients. 

Though I lean more towards the former assumption, the two are not mutually exclusive. 

Another interesting element is how much stigmatization is expressed towards mental illness with different variables. Higher levels of completed education predicts less stigmatization and high levels of neighborhood disadvantage predicts more stigmatization—political affiliation was the greater predictor of stigmatization, with conservative beliefs predicting the most stigmatization. 

Since liberals have less stigmatizing attitudes towards mental illness, it would seem they'd be inclined to regard their own mental state in a neutral manner and to be more likely to seek treatment for mental illnesses; perhaps conservatives are more private and their stigmatizing attitudes prevent them from confronting their mental issues as readily as liberals. There is a concept known as pathogen disgust, and conservatives are more likely to be disgusted by a variety of stimuli compared to liberals (mental illness included), but there really isn't much data to indicate whether conservatives would be more likely to conceal their illness just because of their (or others) stigmatizing attitudes or pathogen disgust—it could be the opposite, and they're more likely to seek help in hopes of being rid of whatever it is that would engender stigma or disgust.

Though the different perceptions the left and conservatives have about mental illness is worth noting, my own particular bias is that higher levels of happiness, lower levels of neuroticism, and higher levels of religiosity and structure explain most, if not all, of the disparity between the two. 

Now we can look at some of the potential contributing factors leading to a higher rate of mental illness (unless it's the mental illness they exhibit in the collection of data above that leads to them holding some of their more bizarre beliefs or engaging in equally bizarre behavior, along with a little prompting and a toxic worldview).
Both average conservatives and liberals are quite individualistic and not invested in white identity in the same way blacks would be invested in their own racial identity, yet conservatives are a bit more "color blind," and liberals are more fixated on race.

Is there any demographic stranger than the white liberal? They are the only listed race/political affiliation category with a negative approval of their in-group (although all other races have more in-group bias than whites). There's some nuance to be noted, however—while white liberals have a low approval of their own group, it's typically the result of a shame/guilt complex or cynicism, and they're colder towards whites who are lower class or who engage in wrong-think. They still primarily have friends, relationships, and spouses who are also white; for the more upper class white liberals, they prefer to live in gated white communities, and they usually send their kids to majority-white/Asian private schools, unless they're profoundly woke. In many ways, they pretend to be unaware of the issues of multiculturalism and will assure you that diversity is our greatest strength, but their actions, as outlined above, state otherwise—they are virtue signaling. They are elites already or social climbers hoping to carve out a space for themselves among the elites. 

A portion of white liberals realize how disastrous diversity is for the whites who don't have the opportunity to live in the best neighborhoods or send their kids to the right schools. Their endorsement of white displacement is a demonstration of their superior status, and it would appear they are content with letting the rest of their white brethren die off, hoping to comprise a small caste of the elite, along with the Jews, ruling over the rapidly browning masses of America.

Not all liberal whites are so aspirational and aware of all of this. Many of them become liberals because the nature of a population is to conform to a central authority (especially the women), and it is incentivized by the strong social messaging and reinforcement from the media and school. They're bombarded with anti-white and pro-minority messaging, slavery and Jim Crow, holocaust imagery, lynchings, Amerindian massacres, and the list goes on and on. They're made to be overwhelmed by shame/guilt for the collective sins of the entire white race, and they want to fit in and be accepted and succeed in the only system that is open to them. What alternative do they have other than to be censured—and possibly unpersoned—as a dissident? All of these systems are designed to "Abolish the White Race," as the Jew Noel Ignatiev phrased it. 

There are also many whites who vote for democrats for specific issues, but are increasingly shifting to the republican candidates or are being alienated from both parties because their interests are not adequately represented. They're often repulsed by anti-white and woke politics.

These predictors seem a little askew. It's odd that "White Image Shame" would lead to a warmer appraisal of whites, when one would think it's the opposite, and the same for "Graduate degree" versus "Some college." The general trend is that with more education, the more anti-white and pro-minority the subject will be, and the opposite for those with less education. Granted, this does vary quite a bit at the community college and lower-tier university level compared to the Ivy League Universities.  

This chart has a much more likely measure for "Graduate degree" compared to the chart above. The most educated tend to be the most anti-white and most liberal, though the author notes that white shame/guilt are generally the best predictors.

(It's a shame that women aren't included as a category.)

It's common to find that the most indoctrinated educated are the most anti-white and the most likely to see racism everywhere. According to Pew, black perceptions of racism or being discriminated against GOES UP for the more educated blacks compared to ones who only have a high school education or less. This, of course, makes no sense, if you think of most schools as anything more than Jewish propaganda. The more education they have, presumably, the more money and opportunities were afforded to them, and they'd be more likely to be around middle or upper class liberals, who believe racism to be a great sin, and who would theoretically be less likely to engage in "microaggressions" or "racially insensitive language." PhD students are not included, but they would obviously have a higher percentage of perceived racism/discrimination than those with less education. I guess learning about microaggressions really paid off, eh?

Can you imagine any other race being happy that their racial group is shrinking into a plurality, and then, probably into a minority? This is a sign of a sick society and a sick people. Furthermore, with the racial animus we're now seeing directed towards whites, there shouldn't be any expectance of benevolence like the whites have granted to the minorities—whites will not receive any perks, affirmative action, etc., as a result of becoming a minority. Outside of a small caste of elites, the white minority will be bullied into submission—remember the South African farm murders and the plight of impoverished whites in South Africa who are discriminated against for being white. 

(The effects of guilt/shame shifts all groups from the "neither sad nor happy" category and into the "happy" category.)

And there we have it. The most committed white liberals are also the most depressed, the most mentally ill, and the most happy to see their own race replaced, and per party affiliation, liberals rank as being less happy, overall.

If we desire happiness, we need meaning—for the religious it is their God; for racialists it is solidarity and a homeland for their own race (that is obviously true for the zionist Jews as well), for only then can they strive towards greatness without being burdened by the needs of a dissimilar culture and people amongst them (ideally, this would apply to all racial groups—blacks, the most dependent race, for instance, cannot develop an organic culture of their own without a nationalist figure like Marcus Garvey—instead, Jews will shape black culture for their own purposes).

When it comes to selecting an occupation, conservatives are more interested in earning money, while liberals are looking for jobs they believe to be meaningful, even if the pay is less than stellar, which explains why so many liberals are embedded in the social sciences like a tick—these positions might not pay that well, especially compared to STEM, but what could be more meaningful than being a shaper of the culture? This is why the social sciences are the most important and overlooked aspect of society—they define the foundational myths, and now they are all negative ones like racial and feminine victimization, colonialism, the holocaust, etc. If the social sciences are in decay, then the same is true of society. Many people believe STEM will remain normal, but it is already under attack and has been—it's just not as blatant. 

Liberals are more invested in political causes to derive meaning and fulfillment from life.

That is presumably a nationally representative sample, so imagine what it would look like if you were sampling only professors or only the political fringes. What if you were sampling Jews?

What specific aspect of politics gives them the most meaning is left open to debate. It could be a variety of issues, but the core issues are set by the media and, in recent years, the most important issues concern race, feminism, and LGBT. Blacks are the liberal political issue of the day, as represented by back-to-back, non-stop months of burnt and looted cities, culminating in 2 billion dollars worth of damage, lost businesses, uncountable amounts of injured people, dozens of deaths, and a large, ongoing spike in crime. Neither the republicans nor the democrats did much of anything to quell their tyranny.

Liberal whites, along with Antifa, eagerly supported the chaos, and they still talk of reparations and "giving blacks equal rights," which they already have, so what they really mean is worsening the conditions of whites so blacks have equal or better outcomes compared to whites. 

Liberal whites are the only group with a negative appraisal of their in-group, and their favored political issue at the moment is catering to blacks. Clearly, if they have negative in-group appraisal of their own race, and they want to help blacks above pretty much everything else, then they have a positive appraisal of racial out-groups.

My world view is intertwined with racial identity, and, frankly, that applies to most racial/ethnic groups other than western whites. It applies to most of Eastern Europe, to the Chinese, and other Asian groups, to tribes, to blacks, hispanics, etc. It is western whites who are incorrect and being led astray by multiculturalism and egalitarianism.

Blacks appraise their in-group positively and are normal—the same can be said of any group other than liberal whites. The most obvious reason for why white liberals, especially of the more "far-left" variety, are so mentally ill, unhappy, etc., is because they have abandoned the healthy impulse of in-group preference and instead adopted a white shame/guilt complex towards their own race, while their existence is focused on racial out-groups. This is not normal, and the leftists of the distant past would not have embraced this nonsense. The real problem is the allied victory in WWII and subsequent Jewish scheming to destroy nationalism and racial solidarity (other than their own), enabling the Jew to parasitize the countries and peoples of the world for the benefit of their diaspora and zionism.

Before moving onto why liberals and conservatives differ, it would also be prudent to delve into virtue signaling and victim signaling—together, they represent the defining symbiotic pattern of 21st century leftism.

Virtue Signaling and Victim Signaling

Leftists hate to hear the phrase virtue signal, but it's a behavior they often exhibit to show how moral or virtuous or good they are compared to others, usually with the hope of compensation for their efforts of espousing the establishment's position. It doesn't matter if what they advocate for is actually more harmful to the people they support or the people they are in opposition of, themselves, or their country. 

study by Ekin et al. from 2020 indicates that virtue signaling and victimhood (or victim signaling) are both associated with dark triad personality traits—the three traits are narcissism (self-centered, entitled, and an excessive need for admiration), Machiavellianism (manipulativeness), and psychopathy (insensitive, low empathy, amorality). Both forms of signaling are correlated significantly with dark triad traits, though the relation is greater with victim signaling.

There was a recent study by Jordan Moss and Peter J. O'Connor that attempted to connect dark triad personality traits to three different political categories: Political Correctness-Liberalism (PCL), Political Correctness-Authoritarianism (PCA), and White Identitarianism/Alt-Right (WI). Both PCA (Your standard Antifa or militant Black Lives Matter protester) and PCL (your standard SJW) have "compassionate motivations," and PCL "want to argue for the removal of ostensible social or emotional barriers of disadvantaged groups," and PCA are more concerned about "physical and psychological safety" and "believe aggression and force are appropriate methods to achieve ideological goals." According to their results, PCL negatively correlated with dark triad traits, and WI and PCA had a significant positive correlation. I've written elsewhere on the topic, but if these results are consistently replicated, then the thesis of the Ekin et al. study is partially corroborated—but only for the PCA liberals, not your average virtue signaling SJW. 

(Far less often mentioned is the light triad personality traits, consisting of Kantianism, humanism, and faith in humanity—both dark and light are negatively correlated to a moderate degree, and one side is not necessarily the opposite side of a spectrum; there are both varying degrees of light and dark traits within everyone, presumably, though some greatly lack one or the other; or have an undesirable amount of one trait or another.)

The west, no doubt, and as Ekin et al. has stated, is a culture centered around victimhood. The higher these dark triad traits are, the more inclined the individual with those traits will be to exploit others for his own gain, to manipulate them, and to feel entitled to whatever he receives through emotional blackmail, and it increases the likelihood his empathy will be low enough that he won't care about the damage he does. Of course, it depends on where he ranks on the three different categories.

The researchers examine victim signaling, which they define as “a public and intentional expression of one’s disadvantages, suffering, oppression, or personal limitations.” They also examine virtue signaling, defined as “symbolic demonstrations that can lead observers to make favorable inferences about the signaler’s moral character.”

Ekin et al. frames their argument from the perspective of competing for resources:

“Contemporary Western democracies have become particularly hospitable environments for victim signalers to execute a strategy of nonreciprocal resource extraction.”

The two signaling strategies clearly work best when combined into a form of symbiotic mutualism—one reinforces the other. To signal virtue, you need a victim, and there is no value in being a victim unless there is someone to signal virtue for the victim. Both are looking to extract resources, whether they be of a physical nature, a spiritual/moral nature, career advancements, or political advancements. Blacks and whites gather together at a Black Lives Matter protest, and they are "showing solidarity," each one in the process of a cycle of virtue signaling and victim signaling. 

We think of victimhood as something very harmful. There are the truly victimized, who are still in the process of being wounded, and there are also the ones ruminating over a victimization in the distant past, but they must always ask if their blame is misplaced, and even if they are blaming the proper source for a past injustice, is there even a point in such a mentality, or do they just become inured in a depressive miasma and fail to make any progress in their relatively short lifespan? 

The answer to that much-too-long question should be obvious, but being a "victim" isn't altogether a disadvantage in the new America. Let's look at black Americans: we know from history that a selection of Africans were forcefully taken from their homeland during the slave trade (often bought), forced into slavery, and upon release, they were truly a malnourished nation that never had the wherewithal to build itself up or become independent, so whites imposed segregation upon them to keep them from being a nuisance to the nation at large and provide them sustenance, and finally they were freed even from that. There are valid arguments to be had in pointing out that blacks were better off in many ways under slavery compared to the harsher life they lived in Africa (think of the bird content to never leave its cage), and in this former circumstance and during segregation, their families were more intact. 

Were they victimized by being enslaved, even if their conditions improved? In a sense, yes, regardless of any blacks coming to believe the situation to be preferable. Are they victims now because their ancestors were victims and "the slavery is in their bones?" No. 

In the case of the post-slavery era, it's not an injustice to say "These are my resources, and you can't have access to them. Here, we'll give you a portion of our resources and call them your resources, over there and away from us," as was once done under segregation. 

The blacks of today have all of the rights of any other U.S. citizen—yes, blacks are worse off on average in several measures, but that is nature taking it's course—there will always be hierarchy and inequality in any functional society. The blacks even have some perks over whites because of anti-white policies meant to "encourage equity." There are tax-incentives for minority-owned businesses, advantages given at university and in hiring, etc. Blacks can say absolutely anything, and they will be protected under the first amendment with basically no repercussions, unless it's against the chosenites, as Nick Cannon learned. If a white were to say the "n-word," he'd be fired from most jobs other than a small business with like-minded folks. 

But anyone can call a white the "other n-word," AKA NAZI or, alternatively racist or other -ists and -phobes. These are words whites don't want to be called because it has been interpreted by the political establishment of the U.S. and the western powers as the most evil thing ever. It's not the same as calling someone an asshole. If it sticks, then you could be discriminated against and fired, regardless of where you fit on the political spectrum. 

(I'm aware this is protected by the first amendment in the sense that you can say a particular word without being charged with anything, but being penalized or fired for your own personal opinion outside of work—like on social media, is ridiculous.)

Sites calling for reparations pop-up all the time (this article is from 2016, and the link no longer works). Even a privileged race hustler like Ibram X. Kendi can victim signal and have whites eating from his hand. Combine that with virtue signaling, and you have a winning deal. Perhaps reparations are on the table now (as if welfare and everything blacks have been given already weren't reparations). Here are a plethora of examples of victim signaling and virtue signaling in action: 1234567.

The victim culture we have now is based entirely on feelings and egalitarianism, of a sort. Whether you benefit from it or not depends on the progressive stack. Are you black or a minority? Are you a woman (increasingly not mattering as much for white women)? Are you a homosexual? Are you confused about whether you're the opposite sex or which of the 72+ genders you belong to? Then you can benefit from this culture. Are you white, male, Christian, and heterosexual? Take a hike. Living at the poverty level as well? Same answer. White homeless man versus former POTUS Barack Obama? Guess. Luckily, the system is not entirely heartless; you can opt into the progressive stack by lopping off your tallywhacker and becoming a transsexual. 

It's not about making everyone equal so much as it is about dispossessing the white majority of their homeland and resources. Elites in general are often content with ruling over a mixed population. Atomizing their citizens into numerous groups keeps every group weaker than a single homogenized group or even a few distinct groups. Then there is the "Jew factor." They favor multiculturalism as part of their evolutionary strategy and have a deep-seated contempt for Europeans and Christians that goes back millennia.  

Why Liberals and Conservatives Differ

There are cognitive differences between the two, of course. An experimental study from Buechner et al. "proposes an underlying cognitive difference in the mental flexibility of conservatives and liberals that directly impacts their executive functioning in the form of working memory." Conservatives are better at inhibition and liberals are better at updating. The former is defined as "the ability to override thoughts and behaviors that interfere with existing information." The latter is the "ability to revise working memory representations based on relevant information." 

These two processes activate different regions of the brain, and political ideology is linked to these specific functions of working memory.

At this point, it's helpful to bring up the Big Five personality traits. Here is an example of where we can see typical behavior associated with the general "types" of the left and right corresponding more with particular regions of the brain.

These personality traits may vary quite a bit on an individual level, and while these traits are shaped early in life, they are malleable to some extent over one's lifespan, if there is a sufficient effort to change these traits. The Big Five is generally considered a reliable and valid measure of personality and has the broadest approval by psychologists when it comes to the personality models—other popular ones being Myers-Briggs, and both have a degree of overlap, i.e., introversion/extroversion.

The two most relevant categories in general for the left-right divide are openness (to experience) and conscientiousness. 

Neuroticism is also important in this context and is found at lower rates for conservatives compared to liberals, as can be seen by comparing conservative states with liberal states. Another study also indicates that conservatism is negatively correlated with neuroticism. Conservatives are more happy than liberals because they have less neuroticism. There is debate about why they have more happiness and less neuroticism, and while it's not entirely clear, it's obvious that more structure and positive values, less anti-white politics, more religiosity, etc., are likely factors.

Conscientiousness is the trait with the highest positive correlation with religiosity, whereas neuroticism is negatively correlated with religiosity.

Agreeableness is noteworthy for having two aspects: politeness and compassion—the former corresponds with conservatives, and the latter with leftists. One study found that agreeableness was correlated with social conservatism, and this makes sense because conservatism seeks to maintain communities and tradition and not transform them beyond repair, even if they obviously haven't done a great job of maintaining them hitherto.

Leftists are more "cognitively flexible" according to Buechner et al., which is partly another way of noting openness; not only do they seek new experiences, they're adaptive to change, egalitarian, and unpredictable. In contrast, the conservatives are "cognitively rigid." They're norm- and rule-adherent, and have greater control over their actions.

Conservatives/the right tend to be more orderly, structured, religious, and traditional. They are resistant to change and favor rules and authority. They are usually high in conscientiousness (this is sometimes broken down into orderliness and industriousness) and low in openness (to experience). They're better at inhibition and controlling their emotions and behavior and not letting any of these aspects override relevant information in the process, but that also means they're not as good at revising the outdated information with new information. 

Liberals/the left tend to be, well... the opposite, but most importantly, they like new experiences, change, and are often much more skeptical of authority (though, in reality, they're just as lemming-like as the conservatives, but they will question anything mildly "authoritarian," unless it lines up with their worldview) and more likely to support the erosion of rules. They are low in conscientiousness and high in openness. 

There are some poor whites who are typically liberal but don't care for the woke/SJW elements, as well as the more populist left who are more concerned with workers and economics, and these would presumably be lower in openness but higher than conservatives; the majority of white liberals are very open to immigration, LGBT, etc. Despite the majority of blacks voting democrat, they don't necessarily fit into the basic definition of what we think of as a liberal and are often anti-LGBT and unsupportive or neutral when it comes to immigration—they vote democrat for minority benefits and because the democrats pander to them the most, in addition to the democrats having more minorities in their ranks, thus appearing more "minority friendly." 

To summarize their findings, this difference in inhibition versus updating means conservatives are better at regulating their emotions and impulses; whereas liberals are more prone to get angry or have campus meltdowns; and liberals are better at tasks that require adaptation, whereas conservatives are better at tasks that remain the same/similar. To give a clearer picture of this, the subjects featured in the Buechner et al. study were given computer tests that were very structured and repetitious and another program that had frequent changes of item categories that had to be memorized. 

One can definitely see how this leads the left and right to different career paths and why very creative roles like artists are often quite liberal.

Being more rigid at adapting to new information sounds potentially dogmatic. 

Ultimately, the study only serves to reveal some very basic differences between liberals. Distinguishing inhibition and updating is helpful to understanding the two sides better, but it's unclear how each side responds to information of significance, especially when the information pertains to politics or their world views, as Lance Welton has pointed out, for another study suggests it's not quite that simple. Instead of just "dogmatism," the authors note multiple domains of dogmatism that corresponds to specific information—conservatives are more dogmatic when it comes to religion, and liberals are more dogmatic when it comes to the environment (though, frankly, they seem to be kind of indifferent most of the time, unless it's anthropogenic climate change). 

Depending on what the information is, it might be the liberal who is more dogmatic and has greater difficulty with updating relevant information compared to the conservative, which is typically the case on all SJW issues when it is pointed out that their favored ideas actually cause greater misery—they rarely update; instead, they experience cognitive dissonance and double down on their prior beliefs. They're open to change or new experiences/information as long as their world view is not challenged.

Further Breaking Down Core liberal Demographics

As far as the big five traits go, it should be noted that the big five traits can vary at the big five traits personality level or at the aspect/facets level. At the trait personality level, an individual set of men and women might have equal openness, but they may vary in aspects of that trait—openness has 6 different aspects in the NEO sub-facets variation of big five traits, for example.

Big Five: Women

Women score higher than men on neuroticism and agreeableness (for aspects of agreeableness, it will usually be compassion, tender-mindedness, and altruism). Studies will often note that the difference between men and women is negligible when it comes to extraversion and openness, but this is, again, a difference at the aspect level. Men tend to be higher in openness to ideas and women instead rate higher in openness to feelings and aesthetics. For extraversion, men favor excitement and assertiveness, while women favor warmth, gregariousness, and positive emotions. They don't generally differ in conscientiousness much, but women rate somewhat higher in orderliness, dutifulness, and self-discipline aspects (this apparently isn't consistent across cultures, in the case of conscientiousness differences).

However, this fails to take into account the variance of conservatives and liberals. Women are more liberal than men, so you would tend to find that woman are higher in neuroticism and agreeableness than men as a default, but the more liberal they are, the higher their openness and the lower their conscientiousness should be. No matter how high their openness is, however, they're unlikely to be high in openness of ideas, which is far more important in the political context, where just about anything can be deemed offensive.

In general, women are more emotional and less logical—they will be persuaded more by emotion, so even if your argument is simple enough for everyone to understand and has airtight logic, they will likely side against you if your view doesn't line up with their feelings; this is a very potent combination with their higher neuroticism, which results in them feeling negative emotions even more strongly. Women are more sympathetic, but it also depends on their worldview, and most women will favor the more dominant perspectives (dissidents needn't apply); they also take offense very easily and are the worst offenders when it comes to campus hysteria and support for ridiculous SJW causes. 

If you pay attention to leftist activism, you're bound to notice women comprise a disproportionate amount of their ranks—whether it's for BLM, climate change, immigration, etc.

Since women are very conformist, they will typically side with the dominant culture's worldview. The U.S.'s power is waning in many ways, but they are still the most influential country on a cultural basis. U.S. women are most affected by its culture than any foreign power. For countries without a closed or semi-closed system that has regulated internet and markets to varying degrees, such as China, with its fewer restrictions, or North Korea, with its much greater restrictions, then the dominant culture is often the U.S.—for example, feminist protests in Myanmar, Thailand, Belarus, Puerto Rico, and various other countries are largely a product of U.S. and other western powers' egalitarian and feminist propaganda. 

Women are one of the most potent tools of societal destabilization for the reasons listed above, and because of this, certain dissidents cast far too many aspersions upon them. They're really unknowing dupes for everything that is happening and require pro-social messaging from society at large and to be reined in by a patriarchal system to function in a harmonious way.

Far more women in the past married and had kids and at a younger age. Many were also religious. The U.S. had a past of being more conservative and anti-communist, and even when economic policies shifted more to the left, we remained quite socially conservative. These were all factors which led to women being more conservative in the past. Now there are more single mothers and single women, and they don't have any guiding force in their life beyond the media, school, and the neoliberal system, all of which is tainted with SJW/woke propaganda.

For the record it's not in any way absolute that women will always be more liberal, nor have they always been. They echo the dominant narrative, and they are the most zealous ideologues when they find something to believe in. The difference between a childless 40-year-old career woman (the most unhappy demographic) who wears a pussy hat while attending BLM protests, climate change events, and pro-abortion rallies and droves of women of all ages saluting Adolf Hitler is purely one of dominant propaganda from a source they deem authoritative.

Big Five: Race

When it comes to breaking down the big five by race, most studies I've ever seen on the subject rarely find a high amount of variation between races at the factor level. The differences at the aspect level are usually marginally to moderately more divergent. Although these comparisons give a bit of insight, differences in average IQ and levels of psychopathy are far more important in understanding differences between the racial groups. When we talk about racial differences, we most often are hinting we mean blacks and hispanics, who commit the most crime—they have a lower mean IQ than whites or Asians and have higher rates of psychopathy.

Whites scored higher on extraversion compared to blacks, as well as the aspects of dominance and gregariousness. A common perception is that blacks have higher extraversion because most of the blacks the average person is familiar with are very friendly and sociable blacks. Perhaps it's similar to the perception of blacks being taller on average than whites, but they're actually a few inches shorter. Height, however, is much easier to measure and there is enough variation in studies to make me hesitant to decide one way or another. 

Whites have slightly higher emotional stability (this is a positive/reverse version of neuroticism) and rate higher in low anxiety. Blacks score slightly higher in even-tempered (I don't believe this for a second) and self-esteem. In another study, results were fairly similar, but blacks scored lower in conscientiousness and very slightly higher in emotional stability. 

Depending on the study consulted, the typical view of blacks being lower in neuroticism and higher in extraversion is sometimes the result—blacks often seem a lot bolder and more confident, regardless of status or competence, so this would make sense. They absolutely rate higher in self-esteem, for sure, as that has been replicated very frequently, and should explain their presumed "social ease." Even if you find a study indicating blacks and whites are equal at the factor level for extraversion and neuroticism, their facet distributions could make all the difference. 

Asians scored lower in emotional stability and even-tempered but scored higher on low anxiety and self-esteem. Asians rated higher in agreeableness, but this may not be consistent with bigger samples; conscientiousness was similar for both, but asians scored higher on order very consistently.

Hispanics scored higher than whites on the aspects of self-esteem and low anxiety (author notes that low anxiety mean difference was associated with only two studies and should be approached with caution).

For a closer look at aspects, refer to the table from the second of the two studies, which I've included below (table 3). For a more detailed breakdown, consult the tables in the two above studies.

Big Five: LGBT

Finally, in all likelihood, gay men and lesbian women most likely have a default big five trait arrangement closer to the opposite sex, for research indicates that gay men are more feminine than heterosexual men, and lesbian women are more masculine than heterosexual women. 

There is often the assertion that within gay and lesbian couples, one often takes on a more masculine role, the other a more feminine role—just as you have the gay "macho" man and the "sissy" man, you also have lesbians who are butch and others that are more ladylike. Presumably, there is more nuance here, and the ones that play the feminine roles are more feminine, while the ones that play the masculine role are more masculine, though I'm unsure how the masculinity of a more masculine gay man would compare to a heterosexual man.

Mental Illness

(All of the below data on mental illness are taken from, unless otherwise stated. Check the PDFs that correspond with a particular group for more information.)

Women have already been covered a fair amount, but above is a chart comparing mental illness rates of both sexes. Women are affected by anorexia nervosa and bulimia 85%-95% and 65% of the time, respectively.  

Mental Illness: Race

Mental health data usually demonstrates that minorities have a higher per capita rate of mental illness or treatment rate. If we look at the first chart, In the past year, at the time of 2013, whites had the highest rate at 46.3%, but they're 60% of the population, and, therefore, underrepresented. Blacks, at 13% of the population, received more than 2x that amount at 29.8%. And with Hispanics and Asians (this is an extremely diverse group, so a lot of variance is probably to be expected) being 18% and 5% of the population, respectively, they are also overrepresented in that year. Researchers like to frame this as minorities having disparities in health care, so if those disparities are remedied, to the extent they are true, it's troubling to think of just how high their rate of mental illness might be—it's always important to consider the overall number and per capita. 

The rate of depression for whites is 34.7%; blacks, 24.6%; hispanics, 19.6%. 

It's unsurprising mixed-races have the highest rate of any mental illness and almost the highest percentage of treatment—in addition to fairing worse on various measures of health and behavior compared to corresponding single-race groups—given the greater alienation that typically results from being mixed-race. How many are considered to be mixed-race in the U.S.? According to Pew, it's an estimated 6.9% of the population, which is a more reasonable number than I've sometimes seen (about 2-3%), but this is definitely a huge undercount, considering 61% of adults with a mixed racial heritage don't consider themselves mixed race (to be fair, it's quite possible that the majority of these people have minimal admixture of another race)—and this isn't even considering how many mixed race non-adults there are. Hispanics in particular are a conundrum due to the very diverse perspectives they have on their racial classification. If 23% of the U.S. population is under 18, and 46% of that percent are mixed race, then that works out to about 11% of the under-18 population being mixed race—so a better total number estimate would be that at least 17.9% of the population is mixed race. 

Hispanics don't typically experience as wide of a range of psychiatric illnesses as do non-hispanic whites, although they have higher rates of mental illness compared to immigrant hispanic groups, who rate higher in measures of happiness. Suicidal ideation and attempted suicide are also committed at higher rates than comparable white or black students. 

It's sometimes insinuated that blacks are perhaps misdiagnosed as having psychotic illnesses—however, it's true that blacks (and hispanics, but to a lesser extent) have a much higher diagnosis rate of psychotic illnesses at a rate 3-4 times higher than that of whites, so while schizophrenia may sometimes be erroneously diagnosed, in many cases it's likely true. 

Mental Illness: LGBT

Bisexuals are interesting as a group because, despite being the biggest contingent in the LGBT ranks at an estimated 3.9% (5.5% female and 2% male; but regardless of orientation, 17.4% of women and 6.2% of men reported bisexual behavior), they seem marginalized and there isn't much data on them compared to either gays, lesbians, transgenders, etc. By marginalized, I mean kind of in the same way that a mixed-race person does not fit in as well compared to mono-racial people within a single racial group. Bisexuals have a sort of "confused identity" as they fail to conform fully to either heterosexuality or homosexuality. They're significantly less "out of the closet" than lesbians or gays—around 70% of gays/lesbians announce their orientation to most everyone they know, compared to a measly 28% of bisexuals. Similar to homosexuals, bisexuals experience higher rates of childhood abuse, suggesting an environmental component is strongly at play.

My assumption about bisexuals was that they were a sort of intermediate between homosexuals and heterosexuals in most measures. If the heterosexual is healthy and the homosexual is less healthy on several measures, then the bisexual would be at least healthier than the homosexual, but that is not generally the case, according to the data. Both bisexual women and men have worse outcomes associated with most measures related to mental health—they also experience greater amounts of poverty and violence than heterosexuals or homosexuals.  

For LGBT as a whole, they are estimated to be 3.8%-6% of the population—the 3.8% number is similar to the estimate I found for bisexuals, yet bisexuals are supposed to be HALF of the LGBT community. Obviously, these are just estimates and it's difficult to get a clear number, but it's also possible a large number of bisexuals do not consider themselves to be part of the LGBT community, which might account for the numbers being a little off (recall higher rates of bisexual behavior without considering themselves bisexual and a lower likelihood of revealing their sexual orientation). 

The newest Gallup poll is consistent with these results, and the new numbers estimate LGBT to comprise 5.6% of the population. 15.9% of Gen Z and 9.1% of millenials identify as LGBT. [5]

It might be even worse than we think, judging by the percentage of those surveyed who chose the option "No opinion." What does that mean? Undecided? Not sure if your selected gender or orientation is covered under the LGBT banner? We're not calling it LGBTP yet, after all. 

Much like how the suicide rate increases for older age groups, it's the same for older LGBT—31% of them report depressive symptoms, and 39% report suicidal ideation. 

Transgenders are the most unhealthy group in America, easily beating bisexuals. It's estimated that there are about 1 million transgender people in the U.S.

Mental Illness: Jews

How do Jews compare? 

Though it's all anecdotal information, the perception from the middle ages and onward—from both gentile and Jewish doctors alike—was that Jews were more prone to mental illnesses.

A good introduction is an article from Jeung and Greenwald, which summarizes a selection of the more relevant literature on the subject of Jewish mental illness from the 1880s to 1992. The earliest study discussed that isn't just anecdotal is from Roberts and Myers (1954), and it solely looks at New Haven demographics receiving psychiatric treatment—the jews were slightly overrepresented in the psychiatric population compared to other religious groups, and they were overrepresented by 2.5 times for psychoneurotic and character disorders. Funnily enough, though Jews are often noted as having high rates of schizophrenia, their representation is even, and it's catholics that are overrepresented by several percent. The catholics were also mad drunkards (must be the Irish), but the Jews scored a 0! Malzberg (1962) had similar results, but the Jews had slightly higher rates of manic depression. Two later studies demonstrated high rates of affective disorders—especially manic-depressive illness—compared to non-Jews, but differences in neuroses were not statistically significant. What some of this really means now is questionable because of changing diagnostic standards, improved methodology, and a greater abundance of research (notably, Roberts and Myers also are using a treated sample, compared to Jeung and Greenwald's community sample, meaning the latter is a more nationally representative sample).

Srole et al. (1962) found that Jews were treated by psychotherapists at 4 times the rate of catholics or protestants. "The data from 30 psychoanalysts in several East Coast communities have revealed that 40% of their patients were Jewish, 33% were Protestant, 13% were Catholic, and 12% were without religious affiliation even though the Jewish population represented a much smaller proportion of the general population." Psychoanalysts (in the psychodynamic tradition, like Freud, Adler, etc.) tend to be Jewish, so it's not that surprising Jews would be their number one customer. As it is Jewish in origin, it possibly caters to their needs better than that of the general public.

Jeung and Greenwald also conducted their own study, and confirm some of what was observed in the past studies. Jews had low rates of alcohol abuse compared to other groups (catholics, protestants, and non-religious), but had higher rates of major depression, dysthymia, and schizophrenia. Pretty much all modern studies I've ever seen indicate that they have higher rates schizophrenia compared to other groups. 

Ashkenazi Jews also have a higher rate of variation to the NDST3 gene compared to other populations, which is a risk factor for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (there are likely many other variants on other genes and dispositional factors, but that will have to wait for another article). 

One of the more intriguing finds about Jews is the 1:1 female-to-male ratio for major depression. As can be seen in the charts above and from just about any study you will find about other races, religious groups, or the general population, females have higher rates of depression compared to men, while men have higher substance abuse, especially alcohol. A hypothesis from the authors to explain this discrepancy is that population groups where alcohol abuse is low will tend to have less deviation in depression between the sexes (to further support their argument, they also note the same 1:1 ratio with the Amish, who abstain from alcohol). 

Alcohol has serotonergic properties, and if there is a 1:1 ratio between males and females for major depression in cultures/societies that drink very little alcohol, then it would seem this is the main reason why. But there's likely a bit more complexity than that, seeing as both Jews and the Amish are very small, tight-knit groups. Additionally, one study found that men have a serotonin synthesis rate that is over 50% higher than women—though this should be approached with caution because the sample is tiny; another slightly larger study looking at serotonin-related sex differentiation also found differences in receptors and binding potentials

When separated by sex, male Jews have higher rates of major depression and a lifetime prevalence of major depression compared to all other males in other religious groups. Jewish women are more equal with the other female groups on these measures.  

Why Do the Differences of These Demographics Matter?

The reason to examine race, sex, and sexual orientation is because the majority of these groups identify as being on the left—or at least vote democrat. LGBT, blacks, mixed race, and women are some of the most liberal demographics. 

Women vote democrat more than their male counterparts, with white women leaning towards republicans more than minority women, and black women voting democrat at the highest rate of any group—leading many to claim that black women won the election for Biden. 

Hispanics and Asians vote for democrats at a rate of about 65%.

LGBT are profoundly mentally ill by default, women are the more mentally ill of the two sexes, mixed races of two or more have high rates of mental illness, and the data is mixed for blacks, hispanics, and Asians, but sometimes higher per capita rates of mental illness or usage of mental health services are reported. Psychopathy is notably higher in blacks and hispanics, and they are the main vector for crime and the movement of street drugs, both of which contribute to our modern day malaise. 

The Malaise We're Seeing Is Partially a Product of the University System

The only diversity we see in academia is one of every tone or shade of skin color and pointless, made-up—sexual or otherwise—identities, not ideas. There was the so-called long march through the institutions and now most of the faculty in universities, especially Ivy League, are leftists (and during the cold war, often clandestine communists), and for those who aren't, you're bound to see mostly moderates and those who are more right-of-center—paleocons, fascists, and national populists of any stripe best keep their mouths shut if they know what is good for them. 

First they target the social sciences—the Jew Franz Boas being a notable one for sociology, along with his student, Margaret Mead; the bulk of psychology is Jewish, other than its roots, Jung, many of the behavioralists, and a trace selection of other big names; the Jew Stephen Jay Gould maligned notions of race in the field of biology; philosophy is fixated upon subjectivity and deconstructing everything—the word truth is white-supremacy and anathema. We're fixated on victim-based and anti-white teachings like "post-colonialism," "whiteness studies," "gender studies," "African American studies," "Queer studies," etc. Even if you take courses that are very neutral in their content, you're likely to see some woke influence mixed in—though your results may vary if you're in a more conservative state or attending certain schools or community colleges. 

Physics are safe, it would seem, for now, but even the harder sciences are threatened by the left, especially biology and genetics. We now have a so-called "consensus" in climatology when it comes to anthropogenic climate change, and an apocalyptic cult has formed around the world getting hotter, replacing Christians and other groups concerned about eschatology. How many times was the world supposed to have ended 12 years ago at this point?

It's not just the SJW/woke brigade or Jewish influence that's the problem—it's also the notion of scientism, where we all have to unite behind a consensus perspective of right-think. Scientism is an outgrowth of academia. "Trust the science" has become their slogan (sounds an awful lot like the QAnon phrase "trust the plan," and given the parallels between QAnon and Operation Trust, I wouldn't be surprised to find out if "trust the plan" and "trust the science" have similar origins), along with "settled science," even if this phrase contravenes the very concept of the scientific method. Listen to the credentialed experts, even if there are other experts with equal credentials who are disputing the "consensus" narrative—the problem is that the media colludes with the handpicked scientists meant to push a narrative that the oligarchs want and ensures that any dissenting experts are suppressed. 

If I am aware of this, then you know scientists, aside from MAYBE affirmative action scientists, are aware of what's going on here, and they are political scientists lying for the benefit of their donors and themselves—or too afraid to go against the status quo. This is why Hanlon's razor—"never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity"—is usually false in the modern political discourse (and science is increasingly part of that discourse), and should be reversed to the much more fitting principle of "never attribute to stupidity that which is adequately explained by malice." 

The uninformed can then simply point to these handpicked court scientists without having to weigh various opposing views. They feel smart and accepted because they agree and find comfort in whatever position a majority agrees with, even if is's a dumbed down perspective fully supported by the 1% that governs based on their own insular needs and not of the people. These same lemmings who "trust the science" also probably were staunch supporters of Occupy Wall Street (OWS was probably a genuine protest movement, but it became co-opted by elite interests) and don't see any contradiction in supporting every position approved by the 1%. Conversely, those who fail to "trust the science" can be dismissed as irrational or low class people who don't "trust the science," regardless of the merit of their arguments—meanwhile, the waters are muddied not only by censorship, but also various Alex Jones-tier characters relying on poorly sourced or questionable ideas (the nonsensical claim that the jets crashing into the twin towers were holograms being an obvious example). These are further used to strawman any legitimate opposition. 

The issues we are supposed to "trust the science" for are positions supported largely by democrats: Covid-19 lockdown/mask policies, anthropogenic climate change, transgender miscellany, and various weird social issues, etc., so there's no real surprised that Americans in general and republicans are less likely to place scientists on a pedestal compared to democrats. In our naivety as youth, we might have looked to scientists as noble seekers of truth, but all you have to do is see the nonsense causes they support and the flagrant abuses of scientific ethics, such as the Jewish Sackler family owning Purdue Pharma AND medical journals, the latter of which lied about various drugs, including oxycontin. Purdue Pharma pleaded guilty to criminal charges in relation to the opioid crisis. 

Academia used to be a source of great intellectuals, but now it seems to be little more than a way to indoctrinate the people smart enough to qualify, but just dumb enough to conform to obvious bullshit—but even for those who are more capable of critical thinking (a trait listed as a learning outcome on every university syllabus, but you're encouraged to do the opposite), they're incentivized against dissent. Academia is now another arm of the U.S. government, preaching a queer sort of religion to enforce its world view. 

The Reshaping of Academia

Even as early as the 1950s, when Eisenhower was in office, who was generally conceived of as a moderate president, receiving 55% of the vote, there was still a discrepancy in academia: of those surveyed, 16% were republican, 47% were democrat, and the rest were independents. Those in the professional schools and the natural sciences were more conservative. Ladd and Lipset similarly found a 46%/28%/27% split. 

Here is how political beliefs compare on the national level and within universities:

The General Social Survey shows that political ideology in the United States has been remarkably consistent since the 1970s and that liberals are not dominant. In the most recent sample, the survey found that 28% of Americans identify as liberal, 31% as conservative, and the balance of 37% are in the middle as moderates. In contrast, 50% of college students are liberal, 26% are conservative and the minority – 23% – are moderates. College students demonstrate a significant liberal lean.

But this lean is not uniform. In New England, the data reveal that college students live in a huge bubble where there are 5 liberals for every 1 conservative. 71% of New England college students identify as liberal and just 15% conservative and 14% moderate. This is by far the most lopsided region in the nation.
Similarly, when asked about the acceptability of blocking other students from entering a campus event, almost half (48%) of New England students thought this tactic would be an acceptable way to protest a campus speaker. About 30% of students in the East South Central, the Mountain, West North Central, and West South Central – a nearly 20-point difference – felt that blocking an entrance was acceptable.

New England schools are collectively an outlier in terms of both student liberalism and their willingness to shut down speech. And the perception that protests against speakers are more common in New England is born out in the data. This lopsided liberal trend matches earlier work, which revealed a similar imbalance, where liberal professors outnumber conservative professors 28 to 1 for New England colleges and universities. And while finding a conservative professor in New England is exceedingly rare and far out of step with the national ratio of 6 to 1, many regions in the country are not as homogenous.

study from Langbert sampled data from 51 universities out of a list of the top 66 liberal arts colleges in the U.S., and he states, "Thus, 78.2 percent of the academic departments in my sample have either zero Republicans, or so few as to make no difference."

Law schools don't fair any better. "A study using 2013 data found that only 11% of law school professors were Republicans, compared to 82% who were Democrats." Social sciences shape the culture, but it's through the courts that the decadent culture is enforced. This is why there are a dearth of convictions against Antifa or BLM,  and why sensible legislation is so often shot down, and there is an obvious partisan slant when it comes to what are obviously politically motivated arrests, show trials, and convictions for people who don't have the correct politics. 

There was a small (though what is cited looks beyond piddly) resurgence in conservatism in academia during the Reagan years.
The trend [a conservative resurgence in academia] was short-lived. Research shows that in recent decades the American professoriate has become an even greater liberal and Democratic stronghold. For example, voter registration records of faculty at the University of California, Berkeley and Stanford reveal that of the 67% for whom information could be obtained, almost 50% were registered Democrats and about 5% Republicans (Klein and Western 2004–5; but see Cohen-Cole and Durlauf 2005). A national survey of faculty in six social sciences and humanities showed ratios of Democratic to Republican voters somewhere between 7:1 and 9:1 (Klein and Stern 2004–2005). A 1999 study of faculty in all fields reported that 72% identify as left of center and 15% right of center; that 50% are registered Democrats, compared to 33% Independents and 11% Republicans; and that faculty attitudes display “an across the board commitment to positions that are typically identified with contemporary liberal ideals” (Rothman et al. 2005, p. 8). Another faculty survey using a more detailed scale found that percentages of liberals, moderates, and conservatives fall around 48, 31, and 17, respectively; that in the 2004 elections 72% reported voting for John Kerry and 25% for George Bush; and that professors hold liberal views on business and the free market, support for international institutions, and separation of church and state (Tobin and Weinberg 2006).

Most of the discussion concerning universities and how liberal they are focuses on students and professors, but rarely do we hear quite as much about the school administrators, who flood campus culture with wokeness, BLM, LGBT, etc. Samuel J. Abrams wrote in a New York Times opinion piece that events were hosted with titled like "Microaggressions," "Understanding White Privilege," and "Stay Healthy, Stay Woke," and it needn't be said that there weren't any alternatives of a more conservative nature.

Abrams looked at a nationally representative sample of 900 administrators, and found that liberals outnumbered conservatives 12-to-1, 6% identified as conservative to any degree (so probably still pretty liberal), and 71% identified as liberal or very liberal. 2/3rds of administrators at public institutions identified as liberal, compared to 3/4ths of administrators and private institutions. 

There is a regional variance for school administrators as well. New England: 25-to-1; the West Coast and Southeast: 16-to-1; the Great Plains, the Rocky Mountains, and the Great Lakes: 10-to-1; Southwest: 2-to-1.

Two of the most transformative moments for universities was undoubtedly more women being enrolled and the monumental rise of the Jew to social and intellectual prominence. 

(I'd also recommend an excellent article from a STEM PhD on how woke capital/politics are more entrenched in even STEM than most would think, as well as the favoritism and ethnic nepotism exhibited by Indians and Chinese, as well as the rampant cheating that is often perpetrated by these ethnic groups at the graduate level in STEM; no doubt, much of what he said also applies to non-STEM directions as well. The favoritism offered to minorities in general is not particularly helpful when it comes to admittance of hispanics and blacks, who are also very liberal (often not so much on various social issues, but in their support for politicians who are liberal); they also have an unfortunate side effect of further dumbing down universities, because of an unfair point distribution when it comes to the SAT [blacks and hispanics received bonus points] and other tests, as well as lower mean IQs, which results in academic standards being lowered so fewer of them will fail.)


There was a time when women didn't attend university at all, but when they did, it was on a campus separate from the men. As standards relaxed, universities began to admit a few women amongst the men, and now women outnumber men by a fair amount. Sexual segregation at school and university (of course, they should be given a way to socialize with the opposite sex, but it needn't be in the classroom) would be preferable because women are distracting, and men and women are far too different to tailor classes to the both of them—instead, classes tend to be designed more so with women in mind; the coverage of topics and the assignments given are now far more emotional and there is more group activity and both have different learning styles. 

Ideas are not freely debated because they might hurt feelings, and coddling people becomes one of the highest virtues when we're inculcated within a victim culture. Women make this 100% worse. The important figures in history are overshadowed by unimportant people, like slaves—just as the Biden administration is reviving the effort to replace Andrew Jackson, a U.S. president, with Harriet Tubman—a slave turned abolitionist whose meager story would be unknown to this day if not for the Jew Earl Conrad (Cohen) and his awful and wildly exaggerated hagiography on Tubman. 

Not only are women 57% of all U.S. students, they receive the majority of PhDs and hold a majority of assistant professorships, and half of all professorships. 64% of male social scientists identify with the left, which already sounds like a lot, but 85% of female faculty identify with the left. Females are less politically diverse than males and more emotion-driven, so this imbalance of men to women is part of what makes academia so liberal.


Oh, Harvard’s run by millionaires,
And Yale is run by booze,
Cornell is run by farmers’ sons,
Columbia’s run by Jews.

So give a cheer for Baxter Street,
Another one for Pell,
And when the little sheenies die,
Their souls will go to hell. 

(A college song from the 1910s.)

There was already a strong Jewish influence in the U.S. at the beginning of the 20th century; the majority of influential Jews in the 19th century and prior were Sephardic—they were the dominant Jewish subgroup for most of history. During the 1890-1924 period when migratory patterns shifted and there was an influx of eastern and southern Europeans coming into the country, along with them came the Ashkenazi Jews—which is now the dominant Jewish subgroup.  Much is said about "Roosevelt's Jews," but it wasn't until after WWII Jews truly came to prominence in the U.S.

A core issue was lifting the quotas on Jewish entry into universities, which were often far more generous than they should have been. All of the Ivies are said to have discriminated against Jews or had a quota (from what I can tell, they were all informal, unofficial, and unwritten. Many of them probably did not really have a specific quota number, but they attempted to limit the amount of Jewish enrollment; there is very clear evidence of this from private correspondence); many of these quotas ended after WWII, but others lasted until years or decades later. 

However, while the Jewish discrimination was real, it was also wildly exaggerated, and Jews were still heavily overrepresented at most universities—most notably the Ivy League—even in the U.S.'s "darkest and most anti-semitic days." 

There's an interesting 1972 article in Commentary from Stephen Steinberg titled "How Jewish Quotas Began," which is fairly lengthy and provides a solid overview of the topic.

While it's difficult to account for the vast amount of universities outside of the Ivy Leagues, Jews made up 80%-90% of students at City College and Hunter College in New York. Albeit, New York has always been the central hub of the Jew in the U.S. 

Even Princeton, which had an alleged history and reputation of being more anti-semitic compared to the other Ivy Leagues, had a quota of only 3-5% (though this is not too bad and gets close to their actual percentage on the low end). 

At Harvard, Lawrence Lowell wanted a 15% quota for Jews, yet while he was still president in 1925, the student body was 27.6% Jewish! Policies were changed by 1926 to achieve a quota, which capped the number of Jewish students at 15%—the quota lasted until at least the 1950s. 

Yale's quota was 10% until the 1960s.

Brown's quota is a little less clear... Jews made up 38% of the students in 1928, which shrank to 9% in 1944, and they never went over 25% from 1930-1940. 

Columbia is also not so clear—they opened an alternate college called Seth Low Junior College (SLJC) to funnel more of their Jews into, though it seemed like a scam because the tuition price was similar to Columbia and a degree was not offered. 40% (they were this overrepresented in 1919!) of Columbia's students were Jewish until SLJC came along and siphoned them off, resulting in Columbia's Jewish demographic shrinking to 22%-25%. Essentially, this was a regional quota they were employing, where Columbia would attempt to draw students from a national pool. Jews who were rejected would get into SLJC or elsewhere and the regional balance at Columbia could be maintained. Certain historians believe the only purpose of SLJC was to reduce the number of Jews at Columbia.

Though Cornell appears to have discriminated against Jews as well, there is not a very clear estimate of what kind of quota they may have attempted. In 1920, the Jewish student body was estimated to be 9%. 

4% of Dartmouth's students were Jewish in the early 1900s, and they similarly took action to maintain a quota; by 1930, Jews amounted to 7%.

There wasn't much information at all available for the University of Pennsylvania, aside from a 1952 article titled "Penn Frats Want New Jewish Quota." This implies there was previously a quota of sorts, Jewish representation in the student body is increasing, and that there was still plenty of friction between Christians/gentiles and Jews.

Most of the percentages I've cited were from the 1900s-1940s. What is Jewish representation like after WWII and especially after the 1960s?

In some cases lower; in others, higher. I'll list the data compiled from multiple years to illustrate how consistently overrepresented Jews have been as students.

Let's start with a 1961 tabulation by Yale University—Yale: 11.8%; Harvard: 21%; Brown: 18%; Columbia: 45%; Cornell: 26%; University of Pennsylvania: 25%; and both Dartmouth and Princeton had 15%. 

Here is a 1967 article: According to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency"...about 40 percent of the students at Columbia and the University of Pennsylvania are now Jewish. At Yale, Harvard and Cornell, the Jewish students are now thought to number between 20 and 25 percent, while between 13 and 20 percent of the students at Dartmouth, Princeton and Brown are believed to be Jewish."

A 1985 source, The Dartmouth, as cited by Buchsbaum, ranks Dartmouth at 11% Jewish, University of Pennsylvania was pretty high at 35%, Columbia was found to have a massive 50%, and the rest range at 19%-25%.

A somewhat "hidden" article from The Jewish Student Press Service states that in 1994 Jews accounted for 10% of Princeton undergraduate students, with Dartmouth having a similar number, and the other 6 Ivies having between 25%-35%. 

Minding the Campus refers to the 1967 Jewish Telegraphic Agency article, stating that "These were indeed very good days for the Jewish community." According to data from Hillel International and Tablet that they cite, fewer Jews are admitted to the Ivies compared to the 1960s and other periods. They're still overrepresented by a minimum of about 2 or 3 times their population percentage, and in most cases are found to have even greater overrepresentation. 

These writers lament the declining numbers, as if Jews are entitled to be 2% of the population and make up 25%-40% of the entire student body! They, of course, make sure to bring up quotas from the past to reinforce the view of the reader that Jews are so very oppressed.

We do not have the data to claim that anti-Semitism is keeping Jewish students out of elite college and universities. But, historically, a drop in Jewish attendance at these institutions has always indicated deliberate action. It is an ugly history. 

The Jewish percentages given are probably an undercount, if anything. Jewish representation numbers are often compiled according to religion. Many Jews are secular, though they may or may not identify as Jewish religiously when surveyed. 

An example pulled from Tablet demonstrates this by acknowledging University of Pennsylvania was just under 20% Jewish in 2010, but that number fell to 13% in 2016, yet if we account for ethnic affiliation, the number rose to 16%. At the same time Penn had the 20%-to-13% reduction, whites also dropped from 64%-to-44%. Though Jews identify as Jewish, especially when it comes to surveys asking about religion, Jews are actually categorized as "white." This means that a considerable chunk of what we assume are whites are actually Jews, and while Jews, at only 2% of the population, are overrepresented at 13%-16%, whites are underrepresented, for they make up 60% of the population, and they're only 44% of the students at Penn; and even when they were 64%, enough of those were Jews to still render whites underrepresented.

There has been a reported decline, so just how well off are Jews in the Ivies now? According to Data from Hillel for 2020 (undergraduate and graduate percentages, respectively):

Harvard: 10%, 53%; Yale: 13%, 20%; University of Pennsylvania: 17%, 14%; Brown: 19%, 6%; Princeton: 8%, 8%; Cornell: 17%, 6%; Dartmouth: 9%, 5%; Columbia: 24%, 15%.

The reasons for this decline seem obvious enough. The Ivies crave greater amounts of diversity, so they discriminate against whites (and sometimes lumped into that will be Jews). They also discriminate against Asians, since this is another group that does very well, while blacks, hispanics, and various other minority groups are lagging behind. It's simply harder for more affluent groups to be admitted when there are handicaps associated with race. Blacks, for example, get extra points on the SAT, so if you have a white and black who are the same in every way (other than race), the black will have the edge. Although it was phased out, the SAT's adversity score was another way universities boosted minority enrollment. They still gather socioeconomic background information to discriminate against white students for college admission, however. 

If we are to remain amongst the Jews, then there needs to be a quota that corresponds with their demographic proportion of 2%—this isn't necessarily that important for every single school, but it is crucial at the Ivy League level. Ron Unz's article on the subject is quite popular in these circles, though even if the rebuttal by Gelman is found to be closer to the truth, putting a cap on Jewish admissions and faculty positions would be one way to reduce their tremendously disproportionate influence and power within the U.S.

First of all, a good overview on the Jewish Question would be Ideas and Data's "The Jewish Question: an Empirical Examiniation" [sic] and Occidental Observer's "Confronting the Judeocracy: The Six Stages of Enlightenment." Some of the information I've used below is either derived from these sources or there is overlap. While I'm focusing purely on academia, these articles include both data on academia and other areas of representation.

In the 1970s, Jewish faculty were the most liberal ethnic group, and were more willing to reduce academic standards to allow entry of a greater number of minority faculty members and students.

Gross and Fosse, as one of their hypotheses, attribute some of the liberal shift to religious reapportionment. In the post-WWII years Jews entered academia in large numbers. "By the 1960s, the college enrollment rate of Jews was twice that of non-Jews, and by 1969 Jews made up 10% (12%, according to Lipset and Ladd) of professors and were 'heavily represented on the faculties of Ivy League schools and other elite private universities.'" Jews represent 25% of the faculty at research universities. 

Anyone who doesn't consider ethnic nepotism when evaluating groups has been so inundated with western notions of individualism that they fail to honestly evaluate what is really going on (not to mention that whites are less ethnocentric in their mindset and much more concerned with fairness compared to other ethnic groups, especially Jews). 

Case in point: the incestuous Jewish circle jerk prevalent in publications, wherein Jewish professors are 40% more likely to cite Jews compared to their non-Jewish colleagues. First time Jewish authors were also three times more likely to have a Jewish co-author. One would expect a Jew to pair up with or cite Jews at higher rates for Jewish-specific texts, but this trend applies to a wide range of subjects (plus, the discrimination found here would be much higher if this were Jew-specific topics). This gives Jews an advantage in academia, giving them higher clout because of a greater number of easy citations amongst co-ethnics.

Jewish overrepresentation in various academic fields, according to Ideas and Data, which draws its data from Scientific Elite by Harriet Zuckerman: 

What is perhaps more notable than mere overrepresentation in various fields, however, is to look at both ethnic nepotism and overall influence on intellectual work.

Kadushin, based on the sample detailed in his 1974 book, stated that nearly half of the U.S.'s leading intellectuals are Jewish, along with 56% of social scientists, and 61% of humanity scholars—the sample was derived by looking at the most frequent contributors to the top 20 leading intellectual journals—these intellectuals were interviewed and requested to select an intellectual who was influential to their thinking. More than 40% of the Jews in the sample received six or more votes as being most influential, compared to 15% of gentiles. Ideas and Data notes "if you use a sufficiently elite criterion there is a sense in which certain fields in academia could be described as being mostly or largely controlled by Jews." [6]


This study from Kadushin brilliantly illustrates what is often lost in the debate around overrepresentation and its true ramifications: yes, Jews might have a national representation in, say, psychology at 25%-30% (hypothetical), which is hugely overrepresented, but it's possible to have large numbers and very little influence overall. Their overrepresentation wouldn't amount to diddly squat if they didn't also have a proportionate or higher influence. 30% overrepresentation, or even lower, might be equivalent to 60% or more in terms of influence amongst the elite intellectuals.

The disproportionate Jewish influence doesn't apply to just intellectuals, but social activism movements in general. Let's not forget the Black-Jewish Alliance, the Jewish role in feminism, and in LGBT rights. These various niches in academia—like gender studies or the various ethnic studies or queer theory—would not have been possible—or at least not nearly as virulent—without the Jews, and so these disciplines are an outgrowth of the Jews. 

Lastly, there is another sphere within academia where we can find Jewish overrepresentation. According to National Justice7 of 8 Ivy League presidents are Jewish. Ivy League universities are the breeding ground of the elite—they are the great shapers of society.

The board of trustees of Ivy League universities act as the governing body; they can be described as the "legal agent" and "owner" of the institution. The members of the board ensure the fulfillment of the institution's missions, handle fiscal issues, and select the president and approve policies. Board size varies, but most boards that I've surveyed range from about 20 to 40 members. Trustees are elected or appointed—by whom depends on the type of institution. Generally, private institutions' (which includes Ivy Leagues) trustees are elected by alumni or are self-perpetuating; trustees of public institutions are elected by governors and legislators. 

While it varies by university, the board of trustees is composed of alumni, students, staff, and faculty representatives—it is common for these alumni to be wealthy donors or political appointees, and they are typically selected from the for-profit corporate sector. An estimated 50% are businesspeople, 25% are professionals, and 16% are working or retired educators. A trustee offers financial support to an institution—whether it be via their own charity or through the influence of others—for example, they are seen as ambassadors within the community who build support for the institution. According to the governance association, more than 90% of trustees donate to the college or university.

Like most of its institutions, the U.S.'s higher education is in decline. According to a Gallup poll, 71% of respondents rated a college degree as very important in 2013, which has now shrunk to only 50%. There are a variety of reasons that come to mind: one is the ideology does not align with a larger percentage of the public. Universities, especially in liberal regions and Ivy League, cater to SJWs, and are woke, anti-white, obsessed with diversity, etc. The degrees are increasingly less useful and there are fewer good jobs to apply for with immigration diluting the pool. Tuition is also very expensive. 

The universities are working with bloated budgets and increased spending, which has driven up tuition costs and required students to draw large loans and take on a greater debt burden. A considerable chunk comes from state and federal subsidies, yet it's only the most elite schools benefitting the most from these hefty subsidies: In 2016, Out of 3,000 colleges/universities (there are about 5,300 in the U.S.), 20 institutions accounted for 30% of government spending, while only 100 universities received 80% of the total. And this is without accounting for NGOs and other donors.   

Ivy league admissions are not meritocratic. Blacks and hispanics get preferential treatment when it comes to SAT scores compared to whites and asians, and it's largely just the 1% of wealthy elites who attend, and many of the poorer students who would qualify are intimidated by the tuition prices and debt. There have been many instances of wealthy families being charged for bribing universities to enroll their unqualified children, but this same corruption is carried out with legal quid pro quo arrangements, where the wealthy will pledge large sums of money to a university, and soon after, their child is admitted to the university. One of the most high profile examples is the Jew Jared Kushner—who wormed his way into the White House on Trump's coattails—being accepted to Harvard after his father donated 2.5 million in 1998. According to many interviews, Kushner's GPA and SAT scores did not warrant acceptance into Harvard over the many more qualified applicants who apply each year.

Similarly, there are also legacy admissions. The children of former alumni, or those otherwise associated with the university, are prioritized over non-alumni children because alumni are a reliable source of donations. Harvard in particular accepts about 33% of legacy students, thought the overall acceptance rate is only 6% (4.6% in 2020). 

According to a 2012 report, tuition had increased by 440% in the last 25 years. More than half of 2,500 higher education board members who were surveyed, indeed, admitted tuition was too high, but 2/3rds felt their institution charged the right amount. Half said they were doing everything they could to stay affordable. 

They've set the system up to maintain their elite status and to maximize inequality. These institutions don't deserve funds unless they're willing to reform, and donors and the board of trustees are a big part of the problem.

This is a section on Jews, and one of the reasons I included all of this information about the board of trustees is that... like most areas of influence, Jews are overrepresented. I have not managed to find a percentage breakdown of how many Jews are on the board of trustees for any Ivy League universities or in general, but it's always easy to find a few, and that's enough to quickly amount to overrepresentation.

Additionally, there is one blogpost that lists the ethnicity of presidents, provosts, etc., from 2010, so much of it is now outdated, but it's another sample of how consistently Jewish the various administrative positions were at the 8 Ivy League schools. The author makes note of whether or not the person in question—should they be gentile—has a Jewish spouse or not, which is always important to consider. A gentile with a Jewish spouse is more likely to be a shabbos goy. 

Within the cloistered realm of the Ivy League, you might find a parallel society, one that does not reflect the average viewpoints of the general population or even the less prestigious universities and schools, but those beliefs trickle down, just as we're seeing with recent reports of critical race theory and LGBT concepts being taught in K-12 schooling. 

Mental Illness in Academia

In contrast to the distant past, where male students may have amounted to the entire roster, 57% of students were women in 2017. From a sample of 33,000 students in 2016, 10% identified as LGBT. The majority of university students are in the 18 to 24-year-old range.

If that age group has the highest rate of mental illness, and there's a plurality of women, who have higher rates of mental illness compared to men, and LGBT—the most mentally ill of subgroups—are thought to amount to 10% of university students (it's hard to say for sure, but a much higher rate of the population at least dabbles in bisexuality more than we would care to admit), it seems obvious universities might not be the most mentally stable surroundings.

How are universities fairing in terms of mental illnesses? 

The National Survey of Counseling Center Directors is a large 2014 study (this same survey has been conducted since 1981, and the 2014 study is the most recent I could find) that collects survey data from 275 college and university counseling centers in the U.S. and Canada, representing 3.3 millions students who are eligible to use the counseling centers' services; 11% of those students sought counseling for individual or group sessions, and 30% of the entire sample were seen by the counseling staff in the context of presentations, orientations, etc.  

The data indicates an increasing number of students were already using psychiatric medication before visiting the center. 14% of center clients are referred for psychiatric evaluation, and the amount of clients on psychiatric medication went from 9% in 1994 to 26% in 2014. A majority of therapists saw a large increase (anywhere from 34%-89%) of numerous psychological problems in just 5 years, including anxiety, depression, self-injury, and 5 other identified items. 52% of clients are reported to have severe psychological problems, with 8% having such a strong impairment that they will likely not be able to continue their schooling without extensive psychological/psychiatric help, while the other 44% are prone to severe distress from panic attacks, anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation, and other issues. 

But there are reasons to believe 11% is probably an undercount. To begin with, it's unclear how many of the remaining 89% of students are instead using an off-campus therapist.

A 2019 study from the Center for Collegiate Mental Health (consisting of a sample of 163 institutions and 207,818 clients) found that counseling centers were overwhelmed and not able to expand their staff to meet the expectations of students, resulting in long wait times and rushed or unsatisfactory therapy. Greater caseloads led to more students reporting poor results, who may have found their only recourse was to find therapy elsewhere. The Healthy Minds Study indicates 30% of surveyed students were screened with a mental illness and/or received counseling in the past year.

Mounting data support the fact that graduate trainees face serious mental health challenges. In 2014, the University of California Berkeley Graduate Student Happiness and Well-being Report demonstrated that 43 – 46% of graduate student respondents in the sciences at that institution were depressed (The Graduate Assembly, 2014). The following year, Smith and Brooks (2015), showed that at the University of Arizona, 50% of graduate students surveyed reported “more than average” stress and 23% reported “tremendous” amounts of stress. Levecque et al. (2017) found that 32% of responding Belgium PhD students were at risk of having or developing a common psychiatric disorder. Additionally, Nature’s 2017 PhD survey showed that about 25% of respondents were concerned about mental health and 12% of all respondents sought help for anxiety and depression that was caused by their training program (Woolston, 2017). In these studies, students’ concerns include advisor relationships, career prospects, personal finances, overall wellness (e.g., diet and sleeping issues), living conditions, and their sense of value and inclusion.

In March 2018, we published an article in Nature Biotechnology further highlighting the critical nature of the mental health issues faced by graduate students. Using the clinically validated scales to assess symptoms of anxiety and depression, General Anxiety Disorder-7 and Patient Health Questionnaire-9, we found that within the context of a cross-sectional, convenience sample of 2,279 graduate students from 26 countries and 234 institutions, 41% had moderate to severe symptoms of anxiety and 39% had moderate to severe symptoms of depression. Female and transgender students showed the highest levels of anxiety and depression symptoms in our study. Positive faculty mentor relationships and a healthy work-life balance were associated with lower symptoms of anxiety and depression (Evans et al., 2018). To put this in context, by comparison the prevalence of anxiety and depression in graduate students is almost an order of magnitude greater than that observed in the general population (see Figure 1) (WHO, 2017).


The authors of the Evans et al. study note “Our results show that graduate students are more than six times as likely to experience depression and anxiety as compared to the general (global) population.” The main issue for me with this study is that it draws its sample from 26 countries, and I'm unable to access the supplementary data. The results of all the countries should be decently comparable if all of the selected countries are all western and of similar levels of development—though obviously certain positive measures will lag in some countries, like the multicultural America. 

Most data focuses on undergraduates when it comes to mental illness, and this is a relatively recent study with a solid sample size. Compared to some other studies on university students, the rate of mental illness generalizes to expectations much better—women have higher rates than men, and transgenders have absurdly high rates. 

As for medical students, they're not quite as left leaning, but there is still a liberal bias; depression ranges from 20.5% to 33.5% depending on which year it is (the number gets smaller as they've completed more years).  

For those graduate students who finally complete their training, being a professor can be quite stressful, so the stress levels are high, which is a predictor for a variety of mental issues. 

Physiology News Magazine:

Tragedies such as a suicide have far-reaching impacts, including sparking discussions about mental health. In the academic sphere, the suicides of professors Will Moore and Alan Krueger (Flaherty, 2017; Casselman and Tankersley, 2019) stirred this discussion and highlighted the need for an increased understanding of the impact of mental health on academics. The rates of suicide in academic populations are not clear and data on prevalence of mental health symptoms is limited. That said, Schindler et al. (2006) found that 20% of full-time academic physicians and basic science faculty had significant levels of depression. This was almost equal for males and females, and younger faculty were found to have more emotional distress than their older colleagues. Further, in a cross-institutional survey of 267 US faculty with mental disabilities, mental illness, or symptom histories, nearly 70% had no or limited familiarity with resources available to support their mental health needs, and even fewer used them (13%), mostly due to fear of stigma and professional risk. Respondents indicated that they felt most supported by their spouses or significant others (75% very or extremely supported) and friends (51%) rather than colleagues (29%) and supervisors (25%), though many had not disclosed their mental health needs to their supervisors (Price et al., 2017).

Higher education is positively correlated with more political participation, and since political participation increases at the fringes (most conservative and most liberal groupings), it's quite likely that the majority of liberal professors and students are distributed more to the "far left," certainly comparing the average professor's politics to the general population would suggest this is the case. The most educated are disproportionately leftist, and are significantly less happy and more mentally ill than the general population. 

Admittedly, high intelligence correlates with anxiety and depression, so is it simply that students/professors are more intelligent than the general population (global or otherwise), and that explains the difference? It surely explains some of it, but I highly doubt that explains all of it. It's rather hard to find much info about tight-knit high IQ groups that are religious or are more conservative for a good comparative sample. More conservative or illiberal intellectuals of the past would have been an interesting comparison, but they're now gone.

Plus, there is something to be said, regardless of whether a person suffers from depression, anxiety, or some other mental illness, for a man with such issues who projects a more inspiring and positive or at least logical or coherent vision. Though past philosophers may have struggled with mental illness, I would not assume they are mentally ill per se from reading their works in the majority of cases; but when I hear all of the intersectional and cultural marxist bullshit, and acknowledge the illogical end result of such noxious thoughts, I can't help but assign these people to the loony bin.

What we're seeing is nothing like the intellectuals of the past. These people appear to have beliefs that promote greater mental illness and incoherence. Their ideas and absurdities are contagious to those who are around them, who are taught by them, and who read their works.   

Does That Leave Any Real Conservative voices?

The leftward bias sets the tone, especially for Ivy Leagues and regions like New England, and while I had stated earlier that it was only the moderates and conservatives who have an alternative voice... it really depends on how liberal the university is. How many students are report-happy SJWs, and will the administration fold to placate them? Of course, it's more complex than a few unhinged lunatics; there's the school board, the donors, etc. 

There's a definite chilling effect inhibiting conservative professors from appearing conservative in the slightest. Conservative faculty (even moderate and some liberal ones) witness other professors losing their jobs or being hobbled in some way for their political views and ideas (1, 2, 3, 4), so they have to be very guarded about what they say. Even an ultra-liberal Jew like Bret Weinstein ended up resigning in protest when there were demands for him to be fired—that's how insane the situation has become. People like Weinstein were complicit in the problem and now their woke students are turning against them for not being woke enough. 

A recent RT article, summarizing the work of Eric Kaufmann, delves into the topic of liberal professors discriminating against conservative professors; with the latter, 70% of those sampled express their work environment was hostile toward their political beliefs, along with 80% of the UK sample and 90% of the U.S. sample admitting they would not feel comfortable discussing their political beliefs with colleagues—specifically either Brexit or Trump, respectively. 40% wouldn't hire a Trump supporter, 33% a Brexit supporter, and 72% wouldn't even have lunch with a person who has normal views on biological sex.

There are structural reasons prohibiting the entry of conservatives as well, outside of the obvious tendency of leftists to promote leftists and block the entry of conservatives—leftist ideas, at this point, are pretty much embedded into the social sciences: 

Perhaps the greatest obstacle is the way in which leftist interests and interpretations have been baked into many humanistic disciplines. As sociologist Christian Smith has noted, many social sciences developed not out of a disinterested pursuit of social and political phenomena, but rather out of a commitment to "realizing the emancipation, equality, and moral affirmation of all human beings as autonomous, self-directing, individual agents." This progressive project is deeply embedded in a number of disciplines, especially sociology, psychology, history, and literature.

The authors correctly assert how this perspective does not align with the viewpoint of many conservatives (though Conservative Inc. would fit right in), preventing many of them from pursuing social studies in favor of business-oriented degrees or STEM—or forgoing university all together. Political leanings are very strong predictors for choosing one's degree. 

Another reason professors seem to be so likeminded would be that tenure is now far less common. 78% of professors either had tenure or tenure-track positions in 1969. Now the percentages have flipped and only about 20%-27% of professors have tenure or tenure-track positions. If you don't have tenure, then it's a grave risk to voice any opinion unsupported by the university. 

As for the potential impact of diversifying universities according to political belief: the effect of that would have been much better as a preventative measure, but as a means of "correcting" the university? I'm less enthusiastic about the latter, though there needs to be a change; but it would require a new government taking the university system apart and putting it back together, whether it be on the federal or state level—any attempts at regulating these institutions by the current regime have been less than stellar. I'm afraid it would require ousting corrupt politicians and then doing the same with a sizable chunk of the school boards and faculties. The two-party "democracy" hoax that is run by oligarchs, so far, provides no solutions.

Liberals and conservatives are also cut from the same classical liberal cloth, so you can't really expect conservatives to be... well, frankly, very conservative at all at this point—it pains me to think of how many of those "conservative" professors are neoconservatives, which are really no better than liberals (Probably worse). From my perspective, most conservatives are like liberals from before they got really infected by the woke virus on most issues. They're bad on social issues, won't defend whites, and their economics are usually some kind of "free market" system that basically means privatizing the profits and socializing the costs of monopolies and oligopolies, tax breaks for more stock buybacks, and pro-legal immigration policies for their donors.

If the universities had stayed more conservative, we would have been better off—at least it wouldn't be teeming with SJWs, but I think America would look about the same as it does now, just the greatest of liberal excesses would have been delayed a decade or two.

Pathogen Disgust

Pathogen disgust predicts the avoidance of people who have a perceivable illness, deformity, etc., because there is the notion that you may become infected or there is danger of some sort. This can occur even with anomalous behaviors/illnesses that aren't communicable in the way viruses or bacteria would be.  

There are at least two other measures of disgust: moral disgust and sexual disgust—and these three domains of disgust interact in different ways for both sexes. Obesity, of course, is met with disgust by both sexes, but for different reasons.

This notion of disgust probably applies to a far more diverse range of behaviors and conditions than most of us would care to admit in polite company. Even things as simple as tattoos and body/facial piercings often elicit disgust, especially for conservatives. Ostensibly, they don't provide a lot of information about a person, but they are proxies for deviance and predict other behaviors to some extent.

The response would be very high for homosexuality. Liberals are more accepting of degenerate behavior, but that's because of an innocent imagination. Give them HIV/AIDS propaganda and show them the brutal sexual practices two homosexuals engage in (often without condoms and coming in contact with feces), and they will also be disgusted—probably even if the observer is gay! Sometimes it's what we find most disgusting that is fetishized. There is no shortage of pornography featuring defecation, urine, abuse, fisting, vomiting, etc. It's unlikely anyone would be aroused by acts of this nature unless they first explore the rapid dopamine rush of online pornography and then associate sex with a stimulus that becomes the fetish. 

Deviant behavior from liberals, such as their strange and negative ideas, obesity (and body positivity), LGBT, especially gender dysphoria, all either represent mental illnesses or are a proxy of mental illness or unhealthy lifestyles, which is associated with dysfunction and lower happiness. It is to be avoided—listen to your atavistic impulses! 

Perhaps conservatives experiencing greater disgust associated with these various states/behaviors is an explanation for a portion of the polarization between the two parties. Conservatives see this state as chaotic and in need of change or at least to conserve; leftists are focused on absolute tolerance (with obvious exceptions) and will defend it stubbornly, the country be damned. One side is relatively healthy; the other relatively sick. 

But the main reason I broach the topic of pathogen disgust is not to point out a potential reason for polarization, but rather to point out why we are disgusted by something and what it means to be surrounded by what disgusts us (or should) all of the time. 

There have always been unsavory sights to behold, but in the past, certainly before the 20th century, we strived for beauty in our art, culture, architecture, nature, etc. Now we despoil nature, much of modernist and post-modernist architecture is ugly, the average buildings look tacky and there is no end in sight to strip malls and fast food restaurants; there is still good art being made, but we're bombarded by the most banal—and television programs, especially reality TV, depict nonstop stupidity and depravity. 70% of the country is overweight. The United States is increasingly becoming an ugly country, and I feel disgusted every day that I drive, walk, turn on the TV, or browse the internet. I doubt it helps the suicide or drug OD death rate.  

You are what you eat is a common phrase. There is some truth to it, yet it's too narrow—this same thought also applies to what you consume in terms of culture, the people you spend time with, your surroundings, and too many other things to list. 10 years on a tropical island versus 10 years in a busy city will define who you are in two completely different ways, just as the ideas you imbibe. People often try to keep their distance from the chronically sad and depressed, because these emotions and states are contagious in a sense.

The left of today are filled to the brim with bad ideas and their behavior is disturbing—they're higher in neuroticism and have higher rates of mental illness, lower happiness, and more depression. If the average person has to be subjected to people like this on a daily basis, do they not also become a more dysfunctional person in their own way? If they cave into the pressure and become like the left to fit in, do they not also adopt their ways of thinking and mannerisms? If they pretend to be one, do they not feel like impostors? If they take a defiant stance, don't they still have to look at the crumbling society that the conservatives failed to conserve and live a life of constant antagonism? The birth rates are dropping for a variety of reasons, but who really wants to raise a family in such a toxic environment? 

The conservatives obviously felt this way for many years. There was white flight and a constant striving to increase their economic well-being so they could live in the nicest neighborhoods possible to raise their families. They allowed the liberals to take over academia by pursuing money and being free of leftist dogma. By always running away, they found peace in the short term, but they never stopped to consider the longterm, and their descendants will suffer for it—if they even care, what with the individualistic and superficial grooming of the American mind. 

I would argue that the mental illness now associated with leftism and the state of society—which is a direct product of liberal social ideas—is making us all more mentally ill and less healthy and happy in general. 


[1]: Although it's hard to say for sure, it would appear part of why immigrant Mexicans have a better mental health profile is the result of a lack of acculturation. Being born in the U.S. leads to more conflict around identity and going through the school system means greater acculturation (there is a similar comparison between immigrant Africans and black Americans, but this is a more complex comparison because of far more divergent samples and African immigrants having more education and higher income on average; i.e., they tend to more elite, have less admixture, and are much different culturally). Although immigrants come here for greater economic opportunity, there are costs in terms of communal cohesion for the next generation especially. South Korean posterity, similarly, are being reared in their own culture rather than a foreign one, and they are more collectivist than the individualistic Europeans (supposedly, collectivist cultures are "less happy," according to data, but regardless of such a measure—to the extent it has much meaning at all—it's quite possible collectivist cultures play a protective role in reducing depression prevalence). 

[2]: There is some conflict between studies utilizing repeated cross-sectional surveys and studies using cross-sectional birth cohort analyses, the former usually resulting in relatively stable or even declining depression in recent years, and the latter usually showing an increase in depression—especially or primarily—that of the younger cohorts. Longitudinal re-interviewing, as can be seen in the Lundby study is not a viable competitor because it merely shows the stability of individual samples over time when it comes to depression prevalence and that depressive episodes and other mental issues tend to taper off with age. 

As for which methodology I find more compelling, it's a matter of looking at the antagonism between the two methodologies and lining them up with observations, though this is not perfectly conclusive. There are so many factors in modernity which would suggest worse outcomes and greater mental illness—especially if we compare amish life to rural life or either to city life. It's not just industrialization that is the issue, but many factors accompanying the western outlook and its constituent cultures and racial makeup (in pretty much all measures, the U.S. and UK certainly rank worse than, say, the Scandinavian countries, when it comes to the number of predictors and their severity). We have a greater abundance of predictors for psychological distress and mental illness now, and one methodology—birth-cohort analysis—comports with what we should expect based on these predictors and appears to be the more salient of the two methodologies. 

It's also unclear how SSRIs factor into these results. There was a 90% increase in SSRI usage in the 1998-2004 period, which would presumably help reduce depression, and this continues to be a factor with any future study periods for depression, thought it's not clear how effective SSRIs are; it's estimated only 30% of patients even use SSRIs as prescribed, and while their effects (when properly used) are greater than placebo, they're largely equivalent in effectiveness to CB therapy, have a wide range of side effects, are typically more effective as the severity of the case goes up, and are ineffective for many users. They are also overprescribed, and their use may not reflect depression prevalence very well.

[3]: I don't fully agree with Sommers and Satel on this subject, but they raise various good points about the idea of "therapism." I suppose, on one hand, they would claim that I'm promoting a kind of therapism of my own, based on some of my disagreements, but on the other hand, I do support encouraging strength and stability within the populace, and psychology should be geared towards that. Only I feel these authors downplay the actual problems we're beset with far too much. It's kind of a typical pull yourself up by your bootstraps or "man up" take—especially their perspective on drug addiction, conveniently sidestepping many of the problems baked into society. Trying to hand wave away societal problems by evoking individual responsibility is never going to get us very far. It's the same with black crime—you can say they need to take personal responsibility all you want—but it is a societal problem, and it has to be treated as such. They are absolutely right on the money about emotional openness—it seems psychotherapy originally catered mostly to Jews, and in time it became the domain of women.

[4]: Major depressive disorder did not become a diagnosis by that exact name until the 1970s (though what we know of as major depression was represented by other terms), and the disorder wasn't in the DSM until the third edition in 1980. Retrospective looks at depression epidemiology are generally somewhat broad when they analyze depression.

[5]: There's no reason to believe LGBT being more comfortable "coming out" is the reason they are increasing in numbers. There appears to be both a genetic and environmental factor influencing sexual orientation, and being abused as a child is HIGHLY correlated with being a homosexual. It's also likely that changing pre-natal environments, chemical exposure, endocrine disruptors, and even intensive propaganda at an early age could be various factors leading to an increase in the LGBT ranks. 

[6]: Charles Kadushin, The American Intellectual Elite (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 23-24, 32, 36 (table).

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